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CORPORATIONS AND EXPRESS TRUSTS
AS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS.*
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of Columbia University is reported to
P RESIDE
have said in an address before the New York Chamber of
Commerce in 1911, that "the limited liability corporation is the
BUTLER

greatest single discovery of modern times, whether you judge it by
its social, by its ethical, by its industrial, or, in the long run after
we understand it and know how to use it,-by its political, effects."1
- In 1912, in a paper submitted to the Tax Commissioner of Massa
clmsetts, Alfred D. CHANDLER, of the Boston Bar, said "Express
Trusts, whether created under wills, deeds of settlement, assign
ments Jor the benefit of creditors, receiverships, or by special dec
larations of trust, to manage property or carry on business, are
neither corporations nor joint stock companies, nor partnerships, but
they employ a distinct and the highest known method of admin
istration."3
The latest Statistical Abstract shows that in 1913, there were in the
United States 305,336 corporations, with over $96,000,000,000 of
stock and bonds, with an income of over $3,8oo,ooo,ooo, and pay ing
a tax to the Federal government of over $35,000,000. The stock and
bonds together represent nearly or quite two thirds of the wealth of
the whole country. In 4 years, 1909-1913, the number of corporations
increased over 40,000, and the stock and bonds over
$ 12 ,000 ,000 ,000 .8
• Address before the North Dakota State Bar Association, Sept. 17, 1914.
Government and the Corporations, by Francia Lynde Stetson, 110 Atl. M.,
p. 27, 32 (July, 19u) quoting from Pres. Butler.
1 Express Trusts under the Common Law, by Alfred Chandler, p. 26. Little,
Brown & Co. 1912.
• United States Statistical Abstract, 1913, p. 6oo.
1 The
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In conservative Massachusetts in the five years, 1907- r9r r, about
6,500 corporations were created ; and during the same period over
4,000 were dissolved .by the legislature. In 1911, it was reported
that 4,000 California corporations would be dissolved for failure to
pay a license tax, and 4,000 more in Missouri for failure to file the
annual anti-trust statement. This shows an extraordinary mortality
among corporations in these states.•
In 1912, Express Real Estate Trusts in Boston alone owned
$250,000,000 of property and there had been no deaths among 17 of them
in 14 years. 5
In 1905, President SrMMOKS of the Fourth National Bank in New
York, and of the New York Stock Exchange, said : "The exten sion of
the principle of incorporation has enabled leaders in business to set up
two standards of morality, to maintain a Jekyll and Hyde duality, and to
do as members of an impersonal and non-moral cor porate body acts
which they would shrink from as individuals. In private life they are
stainless, but in the interests of corporations,
* * * they will have recourse to every villainy damned in the
decalogue."0 And in 1910, President \VILSON, in his address be
fore the American Bar Association pleaded "earnestly for the indi
vidualization of responsibility within the corporation, for the estab
lishment of the principle of law that a man has no more right to do
wrong as a member of a corporation than as an inclividua l.'' 7
On the other hand to quote !vIAITLA::-.'D, "It is said-and appeal is made
to long experience,-that men are more conscientious w_hen they are
doing acts in their own names than when they are using the
name of a corporation." 8 "A very high degree not only of honesty,
but of diligence has been required of t rustees."9 "No higher stand
ards of administrative conduct are evoked by Courts than those which
trusts require."1 0

s,

Special Advantages of Corporations.
The advantages of incorporation have long been recognized and
frequently referred to in the literature of our law. More than six
hundred years ago, BR1\C1'0N said: "If an abbot,
or prior * * *
• Chandler, Express Trusts, p. 10, and Supplement.
Report of Tax Commissioner (Wm. D. T. Trefry), Mass. 1912, p. 18.
Chandler,
Express Trusts, p. II.
0 As quoted by Chandler, Express Trusts, p. .:zo, from the New York Daily Tribune,
Oct. 7, 1905.
7 The Lawyer and the Community, Am. Bar Assn. Rep., 1910, pp. ·419, 438.
8 Maitland, Trust & Corporation, Collected Papers, Vol. III, p. 362.
1 lb., p. 35.:z. •• Chandler Express Trusts, p. 24.
1
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claim land in the name of their church upon the seisin of their pre
decessors * * * the declaration should not be frorn abbot to abbot,
or prior to prior, nor should there be mention of the intermediate
abbots or priors, because in colleges and in chapters the same cor
poration always remains, although they all die successively and others
are substituted in their place, as may be said of flocks of sheep, where
there is always the same flock, although all the sheep or heads
successively depart, nor does any individual of them succeed to another
by right of succession in such manner that the right desce ds by
inheritance from one to another, because the
right always pertains to the church, and remains with the church.
* * * And accordingly if the abbot or the prior, the monks or
canons successively die, the house remains to etem ity."11
BLACKSTONE writing five centuries later than BRACTON, and at the
very beginning of the application of science and invention to indus
trial conditions, in anything like modem ways, says in summing up
the corporation law of his time:''To show the advantages of these incorporations, let us consider the
case of a college in either of our universities, founded ad stu dendum
et orandum, for the encouragement and support of relig ion and
learning. If this were a mere voluntary assembly, the individuals which
compose it might indeed read, pray, study, and perform scholastic
exercises together, so long as they could agree to do so; but they
neither frame, nor receive any laws or rules of of their conduct ;
none at least which would have any binding force, for want of coercive
power to create a sufficient obligation. Keither
could they be capable of retaining any privileges or immunities ;
for, if such privileges be attacked, which of all this unconnected
assembly has the right, or ability, to defend them? And, when they
are dispersed by death or otherwise, how shall they transfer these
advantages to another set of students, equally unconnected
as themselves? So, also, with regard to holding estates or other
property, if land be granted for the purposes of religion or learning to
twenty individuals not incorporated, there is no leg;al way of con
tinuing the property to any other persons for the same purposes, but
by endless conveyances from one to the other, as often as the hands are
changed. But when they are consolidated and united into a
corporation, they and their successors are then considered as one person
in law; as one person, they have one will, which is collected from the
sense of the majority of the individuals; this one will may establish rules
and orders for the regulations of the whole, which
11

Bracton, Treatise on Laws of England, (c. 1264), Vol. 5, Twiss's Ed., pp. 447-449.
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are a sort of municipal laws of this little republic; or rules and statutes
may be prescribed to it at its creation, which are then in the place of
natural laws; the privileges and immunities, the estates and possessions,
of the corporation, when once vested in them, will be forever vested,
without any new conveyance to new successions; for all the individual
members that have existed- from the foundation to the present time, or
that shall ever hereafter exist, are but one person
in law, a person that never dies; in like manner as the river Thames
is still the same river, though the parts which compose it are chang ing
every instan t." 1 2
In 1819 Chief Justice MARSHAL!, put it this way: "A corporation is
an artificial being, invisible, intangible, _and existing Qnly in con
templation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation con£ers upon it, either
expressly or as incidental to its very existence. These are
such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which
it was created. Among the most important are immortality, and, if
the expression may be allowed, individuality: properties by which a
perpetual succession of many persons are considered as the same,
and may act as a single, individual.

They enable a corporation to

manage its own affairs and to hold property without the perplexing
intricacies, the hazardous and enpless necessity of perpetual convey
ances for the purpose of transmitting it from hand to hand. It is chiefly
for the purpose of clothing the bodies of men in succession with those
qualities and capacities that corporations were invented and are in use.
By these means a perpetual succession of individuals are capable of
acting for the promotion of the particular object, like one immortal
heing." 1,:

Special Advantages of Express Trusts.
Upon the other hand the special advantages of Express Trusts have
recently been stated as follows :a
(I) These associations have been found by the experience of twentyfive years to be a convenient, safe and unobjectionable meth od of
cooperative ownership and management.
( 2) The form of organization ensures a continuity of manage ment
and control which appeals strongly to investors in real estate. which
cannot be secured by a corporation with changing officers. The trustees
who are the managing officers of a trust are not so likely to be changed
as are the directors of a corporation.
12

Blackstone, Commentaries, (1765), Ch. 18, Of Corporations.

u Trustees of Dartmouth College v; Woodward, (1819), 4 Wheat. (17 U. S.) 518.

"Report of Tax Commissioner of Mass., 1912, p. 21.
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-s(3) It affords a more economical and more convenient and flex
ible form of management than does a corporation. Trustees can
transact business with more ease and rapidity than directors.
"In the early development of uses a device was struck upon that

gave permanence as well as relief from the various feudal burdens.
This was the joint tenancy. An owner will convey his land to a
party of friends, to hold as joint tenants. "There will then be no
inheritance, and no relief, wardship, marriage. By keeping up the
wall of joint tenants, by feoffment and refeoffment, he can keep
out the lord and can reduce the chances of reliefs and so forth to
nothing.'' 15 There is here no inheritance, only accrescence1.6
fr. :vL,1TLAND names "a few typical instances of unincorporated
bodies" that have lived behind the trustee wall for long periods of
years." He says "Imagine a foreign tourist, with Baedeker in hand
visiting one of our 'Inns of Court,' let us say Lincoln's Inn. He sees
the chapel and the ,library and the dining hall ; he sees the ex
ternal gates that are shut at night. * * * On inquiring he hears of an
ancient constitution that had taken shape before 1422. * * * You
have here a Privateverein which has not even juristic personality.
* * * Its members might divide the property that is held for them by
trustees. * * The English judges who received and repeated a
great
deal
of the
canonistic
learning
were to
a man
members
of these
* * *about corporations * * *
and had never found that
the want of juristic personality was a serious misfortune.17
Then there are (or were until 6 weeks ago) the ships of Com merce
carrying the name of Lloyds into all the seas of the world ; almost
from the beginning there was among these insurers of the world's
commerce only a very loose organization with the exclusive
use of a coffee house, and a .small trust fund, until the trust deed of
1811 was executed with over 1,100 signatures, and until 1871 "it
was an unincorporated V erein, without the least trace (at least so we
said) of juristic personality about it." It was incorporated in 1871,
because in that year there was recovered from the Zuyder Zee, a large
mass of treasure that had been lying there since 1799, and, because of
the destruction of records by fire, it belonged to no one could say
whom.18
There is also the London Stock Exchange, beginning in 1773 when
the name was "wrote over the door" at New Johnathan's Coffee
House. "In 1802 a costly site was bought, a costly building erected,
"Maitland, Lectures on Equity, p. 26.
10 Maitland, Trust & Corporation, Collected Papers, Vol. III, p. 336.
17 Maitland, Trust & Corporation, Collected Papers, Vol. III, p. 369-371.
" lb. pp. 371-3:73.
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and an elaborate constitution was formulated in "a deed of settle
ment.'' There was a capital of £20,000 divided into 400 shares. Be hind
the trustees stood a body of "proprietors," who had found the money
; and behind the "proprietors" stood a much larger body of
"members" whose subscriptions formed the income that was divided
among the "proprietors." "In 1876 there was a new deed of settle
ment; in 1882 large changes were made in it: there was a capital of
£240,000 divided into 20,000 shares. * * * The organization is of a
high type. * * * In 1877 a Royal Commission * * * recommend
ed that the Stock Exchange should be incorporated," and the bye laws
be made sn!:>ject to the approval of the Board of Trade. "That; was the
Cloven hoof. Ex pede diabolum." It was not incorporated, yet
MAITLAND says; "it would not, I think, be easy to find anything that a
corporation could do that is not being done by this nicht
rechtsf iilzige V erein" ( society without legal capacity) .1 0 The New
York Stock Exchange also is unincorporated.
MAITLAND, with his delightful humor, says again: "I believe that in
the eyes of a large number of my fellow countrymen, the most important
and august tribunal in England is not the House of
Lords but the Jockey Club. * * * Some gentlemen form a club,
buy a race course, the famous Newmarket Heath, which is con
veyed to trustees for them, and then they can say who shall and who
shall not be admitted to it. I fancy, however, that some men who have
been excluded from this sacred heath ("warned off New
.Market Heath" is our phrase), would have much preferred the
major excommunication of that "historic organism" the Church of
Rome." 20
This reference to the Church justifies further quotation from
MAITLAND. He says "All that we English people mean by "religious
*liberty"
* * has been intimately connected with the making of trusts.
If in 1688 the choice had lain between conceding no tolera
tion at all and forming corporations of Nonconformists," they would
have been "Untolerated for a long time to come, for in Eng land, as
elsewhere, incorporation meant privilege and exceptional favour.
And, on the other- hand, there were among the Noncon formists
many who would have thought that even toleration was dearly
purchased if their religious affairs were subjected to State
control. * * * If the State could be persuaded * * * to repeal a few
persecuting laws * * * Trust would do the rest * * *. Trust soon did
the rest. * * * And now we have in England Jewish Syn
agogues and Catholic cathedrals and the churches and chapels of
" Ib. pp. 373-376.
""Ib. p. 376.
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In this way were the lands of the Methodist churches and chapels
held throughout England and the United States, under model deeds
used by John Wesley in the very beginninJ; of his ministry to the effect
that the trustees, for the time being should permit Wesley himself, and
such other persons as he might, from time to time ap point, to have
the free use of such premises, to preach therein God's holy word, and
after his death "for the sole use of such persons as might be appointed
by the yearly conference ;"22 these deeds were confirmed and made
perpetual under his deed of trust of 1784, es tablishing the :Methodist
General Conference of 100, and which has been called the Magna
Charta of that church.23
And although our Supreme Court has recently held, following the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, that the Roman Cath olic
Church is a corporation "which antedates by almost a thousand years
any other personality in Europe," 24 yet the great "organized
operative institution" known as the Established Church of England,
tracing its existence back to Theodore of Tarsus, 669 A. D. "is not
a corporate body." •
It would seem from these illustrations, that other institutions
known to the law based upon trusteeships rival in duration and per
manence the immortality of corporations.
It is my purpose to compare these two,-Corporations and Ex
press Trusts,-in such detail as my time will permit, to discover,
if perchance we may, something of the strength and weakness of
each,
for business purposes, under present day conditions.

Theory of Corporate E xistence.26
A recent definition by Chief Justice BALDWIN of the Connecticut
Supreme Court, says a corporation is "an association of persons to whom
the sovereign has offered a franchise to become an artificial,
21 lb.

pp. 363-364.
Life and Times of John Wesley. by L. Tyerman, Vol. 3, p. 419; Lost Chapters
from Early History of American Methodism, by J. B. Wakeley, p. 58, where a copy of
22

the deed for a Methodist Preaching-house, on John Street, N. Y., dated Nov. 2, 1770,
is given.
23

Tyerman, p. 421.

"Barlin ,.. Ramirez (1906), 7 Phil. 41; Ponce v. Roman Catholic Church (1908),
210 U. S. 296; Santos v. Roman Catholic Church (1909), 212 U. S. 463.
,. 3 Encyc. of Laws of England, p. 14; 2 Stephen's Commentaries, 16th Ed. (1914),
p. 806; 1i" Halsbury's The Laws of England, p. 371, Sec. 706 (Ecclesiastical Law).
"' Bibliography:
Angell and Amee, Law of Private Corporations, Introduction and Ch. I. (1st Ed.
183r, and subsequent editions.)
Baldwin, S. ,E., History of the Law of Private Corporations in the Colonies and
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States, Yale Bicen. Pub. 1901, p. 261, 3 Select Essays, Anglo-Am. Legal Hist., p. 236;
Freedom of Incorporation, (in Modern Political Institutions, 1898).
Blackstone, Sir Wm., Commentaries (1765), Bk. I, Ch. xviii.
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Brissaud, J., History of French Private Law, Continental Legal History Series,
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( 1912), pp. 889-905.
Brown, W. Jethro, The Austioian Theory of Law, (1906), pp. 254-270; The Per•
sonality of the Corporation and the State, 21 Law Quart. Rev. 365.
Carr, Cecil Thomas, Early Forms of Corporateness. Ch. IX, in General Principles of
the Law of Corporations, 3 Select Essays, Anglo-Am. Legal Hist. (1905), p. 161; Select
Charters of Trading Companies, 1530-1707. Selden Society, Vol. 28 (1913).
Cawston and Keane, The Early Chartered Companies, 1296-1858, (1896).
Clark and Marshall, Private Corporations, Vol. I, Ch. I.
Davis, John P., Corporations, A Study of Origin and Development, (1905); Nature
of Corporations, 12 Polit. Science Quar. 273.
Deiser, George F., The Juristic Person, 57 Am. Law Reg. (0. S.) 131, (1908).
Elliot, C. B., Private Corporations, Ch. I, (1897).
Evans, F., The Evolution of the English Joint Stock Trading Company, 8 Colum
bia L. R. 339, 461 (1908); What is a company? 26 Law Quart. Rev. 259-263.
Freund, E., Legal Nature of Corporations, University of Chicago Studies in Polit·
ical Science.
Geldart, W. M., Legal Personality, 27 Law Quart. Rev., 90 -(1910).
Gierke, 0., Political Theories of Middle Ages, tr. by F. W. M.aitland (1913), In
troduction pp. viii-xliii, 67-73, with notes.
Holdsworth, W. S., History of English Law, Vol. 3, pp. 362-376.
Johnson, A. B., Legislative History of Corporations in New York, 20 Hunt's Merchant's Magazine, 610 (1850).
Kent, James, Commentaries, (1827), Vol. II, Leet. 33.
Kyd, S., Corporations (1793), Introduction.
Machen, A. W. Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 Harv. Law Rev., (19n), pp. 253, 347.
Maitland, F. W,, The Crown as Corporation, 3 Coll. Pap. pp. 244-270; The Unincorporated Body, lb., pp. 271-284; The Body Politic, lb., pp. 285-303; Moral Person ality
and Legal Personality, lb., pp. 304-320; Trust and Corporation, lb., pp. 321-404.
See also 14 Journal Comp. Leg., p. 192.
Manson E., Evolution of the Private Company, 26 Law Quart. Rev., pp. 11-16.
Merritt, W. W., Some Views of the Nature and Effect of Corporateness, 10 Mich.
Law Rev., p. 310 (1912).
Miraglia, Luigi, Comparative Legal Philosophy, (Vol. III, Modern Legal Philos•
ophy Series, tr. by John Lisle, 1912), Ch. III, Incorporeal Persons, pp. 361-381.
Moore, J. H., Development of Corporation Law in this Country, Ark. Bar Assn.
Rep. (1909), pp. 45-81.
Morawetz, V., Private Corporations, Preface, 2d Ed. (1886).
Pike, L. O., Introduction to Year Book, 16 Ed. III, part I, p.xlvi.
Pollock, Sir F., Contracts, 6th Ed., 108; 7th Ed., 113; Has the Common Law Received the Fiction Theory of Corporations? 27 Law Quart. Rev. ;119 (19n).
Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, pp. 469-51I, 660-688.
Radin, Max, Legislation of Greeks & Romans on Corporations (1909).
Rashdall, H., The Universities and the Legislature, 29 Law Quart. Rev., 76-84
(1913).
Raymond, R. L., The Genesis of a Corporation, 19 Harv. Law Rev. 350 (1906).
Salmond, J. W., Jurisprudence, Ch. XV, (3d Ed. 1910).
Scott, W. R., Constitution and Finance of English & Irish Joint Stock Companies
to 1720, 3 Vols. (1910-1912).
Seymour, E. B., History of the Common Law Conception of a Corporation, 42 .l\m.
L. Reg. (N. S.), 1902, p. 529.
Sheppard, Wm., Corporations, Fraternities, and Guilds (1659).
Smith, H. A., The Persons Ficta, 26 Jurid. Rev., pp. 59-74 (1914).
Sohm, R., 'The Institutes of the Roman Law, Ledlie's trans., 2d Ed. (1901), Ch. II,
pp. 195-214.
State Trials, (King v. City of London), Vol. 8, pp. 1039-1358 (1682).
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juridical person, with a name of its own, under which they can act and
contract, and sue and be sued, and who have accepted the offer and
effected an organization in substantial conformity with its terms." 7
There are three fundamental ideas here: A corporation is a new
person in the law resulting from the acceptance of a franchise to
become such, by an association of persons.
The first of these,-that a corporation is a person,28 separate from its
members, has already been referred ti'> as its chief characteristic and
advantage. This idea of the personality and unity of a group is not
new but old, almost as old as language. We are told nowa days that
the primitive mind of man had a more definite and positive idea of the
unity and solidarity of the horde, or pack, or clan or tribe of savage
hunters and warriors, than it had of the personality
of its individual members. 29
Among all the Aryan peoples,-Hindu, Greek, Roman, Teuton, or
Slav,-the oldest artificial person seems to have been the fam ily.30
The Ancient Egyptians and Babylonians personified the Tem ple.31
Long before JusTINIAN all the members of a corporation were considered
one person or body in the Roman Law.32
The canonists of the 13th century call it a persona ficta, not found
in the world of sense, but created by law, invisible, immortal,
a body that has no body and no soul; it cannot sin, or be excomSutton's Hospital Case, 10 Coke Rep,, pp. 1-35 (1613).
Taylor, H. 0., Private Corporations, Prefaces, and Chs. I-IV. (1884 and subsc·
qucnt editions).
Trapnell, Benj., The Logical Conception of a Corporation, West Virginia Bar
Assn. Report 1896, Appendix to Clark on Corporations, 1st Ed., p. 643.
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518.
Wilgus, H. L., Corporation Cases, pp. 1-167 with notes (1900).
\Villiston, Samuel, History of the Law of Business Corporations before 18oo, 2
Harv, Law Rev., 105, 149 (1888), 3 Select Essays Anglo-Am. Legal Hist. p. 195.
\Vormser, I. M., Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity (1912), 12 Col. Law Rev.
496,
Wright, A. G., The California State Tax on Corporate Franchises, 1 Cal. Law Rev.
91, (1913),
Young, E. H., Legal Personality of a Foreign Corporation, 22 Law Quart. Rev.
178 (1906), Foreign Companies and Other Corporations, Cambridge University Press, 1912.
(The foregoing 'bibliography includes only such works as contain important matter
relating to corporate theory or history.)
21 Mackay v, N, Y., N. H. & H. R. R. (1909), 82 Conn. 73, 81, 72 At!. 583.
28
Sec particularly in bibliography given in note 26 above, Blackstone, Brissaud, Brown,
Carr, Deiser, Freund, Gcldart, Gierke, Machen, Maitland, Miraglia, Pike, Pol lock, Salmond,
SeymouT, Sohm, Wilgus.
18 Morawetz, I 1, p.
2.
'° Hearn, The Aryan Household, pp. 64-6.
n Johns, C. H. W., Babylonian & Assyrian Laws, Contracts & Letters, Ch. XX (1904);
Simcox, E. J., Primitive Civilizations, Vol. I, pp. 171-179.
12 Amos, Sheldon, History and Principles of Civil Law of Rome, p. 118.
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municated, nor commit a crime, and probably not a tort.33 Early in the
14th century these words were being repeated in the year books of
English law by the English judges. In 1311 it was considered a
body ( im corps), existing per se, and not appendant or appurte nant
to something else.34 And only a short time ago :\Ir. Justice McKENNA, of
the United State Supreme Court said "Undoubtedly
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a corporation is in law, a person or entity entirely distinct from its
stockholders and officers."35 It is such, for the most part, in rela
tion to outside parties; it has rights of property and reputation, and
is subject to general duties under the common law and statutes;
and is also considered a person as to ownership of property, and suing
and being sued, and in considerable measure it is so under the
protection of constitutional and treaty provisions. 36
The second of these,-that a corporation results from the accept ance
of a f ranchis e31 from the state,-although now so frequently
criticized or belittled, historically has been as important as the per
sonality of the corporation. In fact in legal theory, the privilege,
the franchise itself, is the capacity of separate personality, conferred
upon the group. The legal ideas involved come from the Roman
and from the Feudal law. From the Roman, the franchise is a priv ilege
of a public nature conferred by the state for political or public reasons.
Anciently perhaps in Greece and Rome groups of per sons were
associated without authority of the state, and acted much as a single
person; but the Romans were jealous of such and many laws were made
against illicit companies between the Twelve Tables (450 B. C.) and
the Empire; Caesar and Augustus did the same; and in the time of
Caius, and Marcian, corporations could be cre ated only under special
or general legislative authority. 38
The same Political theory of corporate existence prevailed in the
middle ages. "The corporation is and must be the creature of the
state. Into its nostrils the state must breathe the breath of fictitious
life, for otherwise it would be no animated body but Individualistic
dust." 39 In the Year Books of our law in 1376, it was ruled that
s, Pollock & lllaitland, Hist. Eng. Law, p. 477. Note 'Wilgus's Cases, pp. 72-79.
•• Y. R., 4 Ed. II, 103; Y. B., 16 F,d. III; Pike's Introduction.

80 1\lcCask ill Co. v. U.S. (1910), 216 U.S. 504, 514. An,! Cave, J., In re Sheffield
etc. Society (1889), says "A corporation is a legal person just as much as an individual."
L. R. 22 Q. Il. D. 470 on 476.
""See Cases, \Vilgus, Corp. Cases, pp, 33-72.
17 See bibliography in note 26 above, particularly, Blackstone,
Gierke, (Maitland's tr.
Introduc., pp. xx."ti-xxxviii), Kent, State Trials, Trustees Dart. Coll. ,•. \Voodward (Washington's
Opinion), Wilgus, (Corp. Cases, pp. 113-170), Wright.
18 Kent, Comm., Vol. 2, pp. 268-9; Taylor's El. Civil Law, pp. 567-57r; Digest, xlvii,
22, 1 and 3 (Marcian); Digest, iii, 4, 1 (Caius).
•• Maitland's Summary, in Gierke's Pol. Th. of Mid. Ages, p. :o.xx.
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·'none but the king can make a corporation."40 And as we all know with
us today "the right to form a private corporation can only be acquired
from the state."n
From the Feudal law this privilege was not merely a personal priv
ilege, but was looked upon as a privilege of a property kind. The
:.Iedieval mind had a peculiar tendency to look upon all sorts of
immaterial or incorporeal things and privileges as property; as for
example, the right of adrnwson. Feudal rights and incidents, too
intangible to be called holdings, were yet considered property in the
:.Iedieval law."12 In 1691 it \Vas said "the whole frame and essence
of the corporation consist" of the franchises which are "the liga
ments of this body politic." 43 CoMYNS says in 1740, "A corporation is
a franchise created by the king." BLACKSTONE and KENT say the same.
Such a view is not dead nor sleepeth yet. It was the real basis of Mr.
Justice WASHINGTON's decision in the Dartmouth Col lcgc case.u In
1887, Mr. Justice BRADLEY said: "A franchise is a
right of public concern. * * * No persons can make themselves a
body corporate an.cl politic without legislative authority. Corporate
capacity is a franchise."45 Ten years ago the Supreme Court of
California said "The right to be and exist as a corporation is a
grant by the sovereign power, a valuable right" and subject to taxa
tion.40 And just the other day it was said: "A corporate franchise is
the right to exist as an entity for the purpose of doing things per mitted
by law." 47 And the exercise of such right is subject to taxa tion.48
The third of these,-that a corporation is really an association or
collection of individuals, is strongly insisted upon by Mr. 1forawetz
and Mr. Taylor. Mr. Morawetz says: It is "essential to bear in mind
distinctly that the rights and duties of an incorporated association,
are in reality, the rights and duties of the persons who compose it,
not of an imaginary being."40 And Mr. Taylor: There are "two
•

0

Y. B., 49 Ed. III, 17.

n People v. Mackey (1912), 255 Ill. 144, 156, 99 N. E. 370.
., McKcchnie, Magna Carta, pp. 383-4.
"'King v. London, Carthew, 217; 1 Show. 275-6,
.. 4 \Vheat. 518 on 657, (1819).
•• California v, Central Pacific Ry. Co., 127 U. S. ,, 40.
.. Bank of California v. City & Co. of San Francisco (1904), 142 Cal. 276, 100Am. St.
R. 130, 75 Pac. 832; Crocker v. Scott, 149 Cal. 575, 87 Pac. 89; Western Union Oil Co.
v. Los Angeles (19n), 161Cal. 204, n8 Pac. 721; Farr Alpaca Co. v. Commw. (1912), 212
Mass. 156. Compare Detroit &c. Ry. Co. v. Common Council (1901), 125
;\lich. 673, 84 Am. St. R. 589, 85 N. W. 96; Blackrock Copper Min. Co. v. Tingey
( 1908), 34 Utah 369, 98 Pac. 180; Cooper v. Utah Light &c. Co. (1909), 35 Utah, 570,
102 Pac. 202. See 1 Cal. Law Rev. 91 (1913).
"State v. Business Men's Assn. ( 1914), - Mo. App., -, 163 S. W. 901.
•• People v. Sohmer ( 1914), 147 N. Y. S. 6II.
•• Morawctz Private Corp. 2d Ed. Preface and U 227-231 ; Sec Note \Vilgus Cases,
p.
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meanings of the term corfX)ration; the one, the sum of legal rela tions
subsisting in respect to the corporate enterprise; the other the organic
body of shareholders, whose acts cause the operation of the rules of
law in the constitution. These two conceptions include all that is
really connoted by the term in whatever sense used. And, if so, what
has become of the venerable 'legal person'? Is he still somewhere, as
he has aways been imagined? Or is he nowhere as he has always
actually been? Shall we say he is the combination, the mystic
unification of our two conceptions? Better not ; better forget him."Go
T/1<eory of the T ru.st.51
Trusts of course are the creation of the English courts of equity.
As :\lAITLAND says, "Of all the exploits of equity the largest and
most important is the invention and development of the
"'Taylor, Private Corp., Preface, §§ 48-51. See Note \Vilgus Cases, p. 1 I 1.
Bibliography:
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Hampson, Sir G. F., Liabilities of Trustees, and Indemnity allowed them by Courts
of Equity (1830).
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Hill, James, Law Relating to Trustees (1846, and subsequent editions).
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Hohfeld, W. N., Relation between Equity and Law (1913), 11 Mich. Law Rev.
537 ct seq.
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(18go).
Kenneson, T. D., Cases on Trusts (19n).
Lewin, Thomas, Law of Trusts and Trustees (1839, and subsequent editions).
Loring, A. P., Trustees Handbook (3d Ed. 1907).
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Trust. It is an institute of great elasticity and generality; as elastic,
as general as contract." 62
Our trust is refined from the doctrine of uses as they were
established in our law before the Statute of Uses. 63 The older
writers traced uses to the Roman fidei-commissa, introduced in the
Roman law, 170 years B. C. to evade the laws prohibiting the appointing of
a daughter, stranger or' an exile as an heir. The testator devised his
property to a qualified citizen as his heir, uni versal devisee, or executor,
with a request, by precatory words, depending only on the good faith
or honor, strong in the Roman
breast, of such heir to restore or hand over the inheritance, or a
part of it, to the designated person. To secure the enforcement of
the request the testator implored or appealed to the Emperor, to
AucusTus, who flattered by such appeal, on the advice of a com
mittee of jurisconsults, made these requests obligatory, under the
direction of the Consuls; and later under MARCUS AURELIUS, a praetor
was appointed to enforce them, acting extra ordin em.34
Later writers, such as POLLOCK and MAITLAND, doubt the direct descent
of our doctrine of uses and trust from this Roman origi nal,55 mainly
becaUje different terms were used in our early law. They say, however,
that "The Frank of the Lex Salica, (475 A. D.)
Scrutton, T. S., Roman Law Influence in Chancery, 1 Select Essays Anglo-Am.
Legal Hist., p. 208 ct seq.
, Sears, J. H., Trust Estates as Business Companies (1912).
Spence, George, Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery (1846).
. Tax Commissioner of Massachusetts, Report on Voluntary Ass'ns (1912); also Re port
of Special Commission to investigate voluntary associations in Massachusetts (1913). (No.
1788 House.)
Underhill, A., Law Relating to Private Trusts and Trustees (1896).
Veeder, V. V., A Century of English Judicature, 1 Select Essays Anglo-Am. Leg.
Hist., p. 730, 13 Green Bag, 23 ct seq.
Whitlock, A. N., Classification of the Law of Trusts, 1 Cal. Law Rev. 215 (1913).
·
Willoughby, R. M. P., The Legal Estate (1912), Cambridge Univ. Press.
Willis, J. W., Duties and Responsibilities of Trustees (1827).
Wilson, S. D., Courts of Chancery in the American Colonies, 28 Am. Law Rev.
(1884), pp. 226-255, 2 Select Essays Anglo-Am. Leg. Hist. 779.
Woodruff, E. H., History of Chancery in Massachusetts, s Law Quart. Rev. 370
(1889).
Of course much will be found in the standard works on Equity_ not mentioned above such
as Abbott's Cases (1909), Adams (1850 and later editions), Beach (1892), Bispham (1878 and
later editions), Eaton (1906), Hutchins and Bunker's Cases (1902), Langdcll (1904), Pomeroy
(1881 and later editions), Smith, II. A. (1908), Snell, G. H. T. (13th
F.d. 1901 ), Story (1836 and later editions).
"'.Maitland, Lectures on Equity, p. 23. 63
lb. p. 24.
"'Spence, Equitable Jurisdiction, Vol. I, p. *435, Kent, Com., Vol. 4, p. *289. Bernard's
First Year of Roman Law, U 813-818; Roby, Roman Private Law, Vol. I, p. 356.
.. Maitland, Equity, p. 32; Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, 2d Ed., Vol.
II, p. 239.
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is already employing it; by the intermediation of a third person, whom
he puts in seisin of his lands and goods, he succeeds in ap pointing or
adopting an heir." 56 MAITLAND finds the same thing in the Lombard
law. He says: "Th Lombard cannot make a genuine
testament. He therefore transfers the whole or some part of his
property to a Treiiliander, who is to carry out his instructions." , Mr.
Justice HOLMES says that "The feoffee to uses of the early
English law, corresponds point by point to the Salman
of the early German law. * * * The Salman, like the feoffee, was
a person, to whom land was transferred in order that he might make
a conveyance according to his grantor's directions, * * *
usually after the grantor's death, the grantor reserving the use of
the land himself during his life. To meet the chance of the Sal man's
death before the time for the conveyance over, it was com mon to
employ more' than one, and persons of importance were selected for
the office. The essence of the relation was the fiducia
or trust reposed in the fide/is nianus, who sometimes confirmed his

m an

o
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obligation by an oath or covenant. * * * The executor of the
early German will was simply a Salman whose duty it was to see
legacies and so forth paid if the heirs refused. * * * There can
be no doubt of the identity of the continental executor and the officer
of the same name described by GLANVILLE ( r18o) ; and thus the
connection between the English and the German law is made certain.58
"The beneficiary had however no action to compel the perfor mance
of the duty of the continental Salman," 59 and "the transform ation of
the honorary obligation of the f eoffee into a legal obliga tion was a
purely English development."00 This duty was enforced against
executors in the case of bequests of personal property, in the
ecclesiastical courts, and possibly to some extent in the case of lands
devisable by custom in some of the cities.61
For a long time even before the Conquest the term use had been in
use, but yet as MAITLAND wittily says, it has "mistaken its own
origin." The word is not the Latin "usus" ( i. e. a using of a
thing), but the Latin opus. From the 7th and 8th centuries, ad' opus,
for "on his behalf," is found in Lombard and Frank documents;
Trust and Corporations, 3 Coll. Papers, p. 327•
.. Holmes Early Eng. Equity, I Law Quart. Rev. 162-174 (1885); Select Essays AngloAm. Leg. Hist., Vol. z, p. 705. Maitland, Equity, p. 26.
•• Note 4, Ames, Lectures on Legal History, Origin of Uses, p. 237. 2 Select
Essays Anglo-Am. Leg. Hist., 737 et seq.
00 Ames, Lectures on Legal Hist. p. 237.
61 Ames, lb., p. 235; Holmes, Early Eng. Equity, Select Essays Anglo-Am. Leg.
2
Hist., pp. 710-714.
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in the Old French these become "al oes, ues," which the English tongue,
confused with "use." The Latin records however read ad opus,-ad opus
Johann·is, i. e. on behalf of John. As far back as Domesday Book, one
person is constantly doing things ad optts an other; the Sheriff seizes "ad
opus Regis, as os le Roy." 02 If one is going on a crusade he
occasionally conveyed his land to another to be held to the use of his
children, or his wife or sister, for he was not certain whether a woman
could hold a military fee, or whether he could enfeoff his wife. So
too, a man might want to give his property to a convent, to the use of
the library, or the hospital. And when the Franciscan friars came as
missionaries to the English towns, about 1225, with their rule forbidding
them to own anything, the faithful benefactor, who wanted to give
them some poor dormitory in which to live and sleep, struck upon the
curious plan of conveying a house to the borough community "to the
use of," or "as an inhabitation for" the friars. And by the time of
BRACTON, "plots of land in London had been thus con veyed to the
city for the benefit of the F ranciscians."63 This was
in the 13th century.
In the 14th century, landowners began conveying lands to their
friends a.d qpus suum, to the use of themselves. Why? Because
they have found they can in effect make a will of their lands in
this way; for if A conveys his lanrl to B to hold on behalf of A while
he lives, and then when A dies to give it to some one sug gested by A
before he dies, it is equivalent to a will. The direct devise of lands
under the feudal system had been denied to land owners for two or
three centuries. Men especially among the great want to provide
for their daughters and younger sons. John of Gaunt wants to provide
for his illegitimate children. There were other reasons also; to avoid the
feudal burdens of wardship, mar riage, forfeitures and escheats, the
statutes of mortmain,-and per haps also to defraud one's creditors.e.
Between 1396 and 1403, the Chancellor had interfered to protect these
beneficiaries, and is ordering defendants by the writ of subpcena, "to
do whatever shall be ordained by us," or to "do what right and good
faith," or "good faith and conscience" demand, since the plaintiff
"cannot have remedy by the law of the Holy church nor by the
common law ;05 and one great doctrine, "Equity acts upon the person,"
was taking
a Maitland, Equity, p. 24. See Note, Pollock and Maitland, Hist. of Eng. Law, 2d
Ed., Vol. II, p. 233.
• Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, Vol. 2, 2d Ed., p. 231.
"Maitland, Equity, pp. 25-30.
11 Ames, Lectures on Legal History, Origin of Uses, Note 3, p. 236, and note 1,
p. 238.
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shape. "The law regards chiefly the right of the plaintiff and gives
judgment that he recover the land, debt, or damages because they, are
his. Equity lays stress upon the duty of the defendant, and decrees that.
he do or refrain from doing a certain thing because he ought to act
or forbear."88
This term 'ad opus' in the early time was used also for what we now
use "agency." In the very ancient days both in France and England, a
man, such as the King's officer, will receive money not as agent of,
but to the use of, ad opits, the king, or some one else; and in time,
where the party is authorized to do some act in refer ence to money or
chattels on behalf of another, as where A's bail iff, B, takes A's corn
to market, sells it, and buys cattle, ad opus A, this develops into a
law of agency, so that if B converts the corn or cattle or money
received to his own use (ad opus suum proprium) the common law will
recognize the wrong and furnish a remedy in debt or account. 87
It was not so however in the case of land, although it looks much
like a contract, and there certainly is an agreement when "in con
sidef'ation of a conveyance made by A to X, Y, Z, they agree that they
will hold the land for the behoof of A, will allow him to enjoy it, and
will convey it as he shall direct."69 Why is this not a con
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tract, and why did the court·s not enforce it?
There are two
or three reasons: (I) The feofee did not formally promise , or covenant
under his seal; (2) In the 14th century the common law had not begun
to enforce 'the simple contract,' and by the 15th century when the
simple contract began to be enforced in the courts of common law,'' in
an action of assumpsit, the Chancellor was already in possession of this
field of jurisdiction and was already enforcing uses by means of a
procedure far more efficient and far
. more flexible than any which the old courts could have employed;
(3) Where the promise was to convey as directed after the death of
the . feoffor, of course the feoffor could not enforce it, his heir would
not, for it would be to his interest not to do so ; so the only one wanting
to enforce it would be the beneficiary; the court of Chancery early
recognized this, and gave him the remedy, and even in the earliest
instances where the trustor and the cestui que use10 are the same, still
it is as "destinatory," not as "author of the trust" that he has the
remedy. This marks it off from contract.
(4) Then again if the feoffor who was also the cesttti qtte use, had
"'Ames lb., p. 231.
81 Pollock and Maitland, History of Eng. Law, 2d Ed., Vol. II, pp. 229, 230.
• lb., p. 231.
00
Maitland, Equity, p. 28.
ro On the proper use of this term, and ccstui quc trust, see 26 Law Quart. Rev. 196.
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only a contract right, it would be a chose in action, and inalienable,
which the landowner did not want. 71
And so what kind of a right is this which the destinatory, th
beneficiary, the cestui que use, has? Is it a right in rem or in per
sonam? To follow MAITLAND here: "It seems a little of both."72
"The right of cestui que use or cestui que trust begins by being a
right in personam. Gradually it begins to look somewhat like a
right in rem.18 But it never has become this, no, not even in the
present day." "The new class of rights is made to look as much like
rights in rem (estates in land) as the Chancellor can make them look;
that is in harmony with the real wish of the parties who are using the
device. They are also taking the common law as their model. Thus
we get a conversion of the use into an incorporeal thing,-in which
estates and interests exist,-a sort of immaterial ized piece of
land."H "The use came to be conceived of as a sort of metaphysical
entity in which there might be estates very similar
to those which could be created in land, estates in possession, re
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mainder, reversion, estates descendible in this way or tha t."76 But it
is "neither jus i1' re nor ad rem, neither right, title nor interest in law,
but a species of property unknown to the common law, and owing its
existence to the equitable jurisdiction of chancery, rest
ing upon confidence in the person and privity of estate; * * * it
was rather a hold upon the conscience of the f eoffee to uses than a a
lien upon, or interest in the land; and the principle upon which it
was founded was that the feoffee was bound in conscience to fol low
the direction of the f eoffo r."76
"The trustee is the owner, the full owner of the thing, while the
cestui que trust has no rights in the thing." 77
This thing,-the trust res, or trust fund owned by the trustee
the court of chancery converted into an incorporeal thing which
can change its dress but maintain its identity. "Today it appears as
a piece of land; tomorrow it may be some gold coins rn a purse;
n Maitland, Equity, pp. 28-31.
12 lb., p. 23.
13 lb., p. 29•
.. lb., p. JI.
15 lb., p. 33.
"Stebbins, Senator, in McCartee v. Orphan's Asylum (1827), 9 Cowen (N. Y.)
437, 18 Am. Dec. 516, I Wilgus, Corp. Cas. 1021. Wehner v. Thurmond (1908), 17
Wyo. 268, 129 Am. St. R. 111 3, 98 Pac. 590, 99 Pac:. 1 128. On the nature of a trust, see
particularly cases in Ames's Cases on Trusts, Secs. I to V, pp. 1-77, Ch. I; Secs. I and II,
Ch. II, pp. 235-278. Hart, W. G., The place of trust in jurisprudence (1912), 28 Law Q.
Rev. 290; Whitlock, A. N., Classification of the law of trusts {1913), 1 Cal. Law Rev. pp.
215-221.
11

Maitland, Equity, p. 47. Ames's Cases, Ch. II, Sec. II, pp. 235-278; Kenneson'a

Cases, Ch. II, pp. 111-152.
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then it will be a sum of Consols; then it will be shares in a Rail way
Company; and then Peruvian Bonds. When all is going well, changes
of investment may often be made; the trustees have been given power
to make them. All along the 'trust f11nd' retains its
identity. * * * But the same idea is applied even when all is not
going well." 78
Mr. MAITLAND contends stoutly, and perhaps correctly, notwith
standing frequent loose statements to the contrary, that the bene ficiary
has no right in the thing, in the trust fund; the equitable

estates and interests are not jura in rem; * * * but essentially jura
in personam, not rights against the world at large but rights against

certain persons.70 Notwithstanding this, the beneficiary is treated as
having an estate in fee simple, or in fee tail, or for life in the
use or trust, or an equitable estate ; or as having a term of years in the
use or trust. These estates and interests were to devolve and be
transmitted like the analogous estates and interests known to and
protected by the common law. The equitable fee would descend
to heirs general, the equitable estates tail to heirs in tail, equitable
chattel interests would pass to the executors or administrators.
* * * The equitable estate or interest could be conveyed or as
signed inter vivos; and they can be devised or bequeathed ; curtesy
but not dower could be had in them ; they did not escheat; and they
could be reached by a creditor of the beneficiary.
All these look like rights in rem. Yet "the right of the cestui que
trust is the benefit of an obligatioa," 80 and is available against not
the whole world, but only against certain persons; these are: (I) The
trustee who has undertaken to hold in trust; ( 2) "those who come to
the lands or goods by inheritance or succession from the original
trustee, his heir, executors, administrators, or doweress;
(3) the trustees creditors; (4) the trustees donee, who takes with
out giving a valuable consideration; (S) the purchaser fr'om the
trustee for value, who knows of the trust; (6) the purchaser from the
trustee who ought to know of the trust," "who would have known of
the trust had he behaved as prudent purchasers behave," according
to the estimate of equity judges,-and not of an ordinary jury. If he
did not come up to this standard he was "affected with notice," or
had "constructive notice," and was not protected.81
"Ilut here a limit was reached. Against a person who acquires a
legal right bona fide, for value, without notice express or con'"Maitland, Trust and Corporation, 3 Coll. Papers, pp. 350-351,
n Maitland, Equity, p. 112, et seq. Langdell, Equity, pp. 5-6, 254 (2d Ed.).
., lb., p. 116. But compare Mr. Whitlock's article in 1 Cal. Law Rev. 215, and
Bispham'• and Pomeroy'• Classifications.
11 Maitland, Equity, pp. 117-119.

-19structive of the existence of equitable rights those rights are of no
avail,''-and here is the difference between the beneficiary's right, and
a true right in rem.82

Creation of Corporations.
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Long ago, Lord CoKE in the Case of Sutton's Hospital, said these
"things are of the essence of a corporation: (I) Lawful authority of
incorporation; and that may be by four means, sc. by the com
mon law, as the King himself, etc.; by authority of parliament;
by the King's Charter, (as in this case) ; and by prescription. The 2d
which is of the essence of the incorporation, are parties to be in
corporated, and that in two manners, sc. persons natural, or bodies
incorporate and political. ( 3) A name by which they are incor porated,
as in this case governors of the lands, etc. (4) Of a place, for without
a place no incorporation can be made; here the place
is in the charter house in the County of Middlesex. * * * (5) By
words sufficient in law, but not restrained to any certain legal and
prescript form of words." 88
This statement, for the most part is as applicable and accurate
today as it was three hundred years ago when it was written. We
yet have corporations existing by the common law,-as the state
itself is a corporation, and our governors and officers are corpora tions
sole for certain purposes, by implication or necessity.84 Public
corporations may exist with us by prescription, and private also, where
the statute of limitations runs against the state in quo war
ranto proceedings.n We still have corporations in this country that
exist by virtue of a King's charter granted before the revolution, as in
the case of Dartmouth College.86 This method of creating cor porations de
novo, still exists in England, but of course not with us ; and although
Lord BALTIMORE, under authority conferred upon him by the Charter
of Maryland in. 1667 incorporated the Mayor, Re corder, Aldermen and
Common Council of the City of St. Marys, and William PENN, by a
similar provision in the Charter of Penn sylvania, in 1701 granted a
charter of incorporation to the city of
l b., p. 119.
"'The Case of Sutton's· Hospital (1613) 10 Coke 1, 23a et seq., 1 Wilgus Cases,
p. 264.
81 The Governor v. Allen (1847), 8 Humph. (27 Tenn.) 176, 1 Wilgus, Corp. Cases,
70, note 27 5.
.., Greene v. Dennis (1826), 6 Conn. 292, 16 Am. Dec. 58, 1 Wilgus Cases, 275, note
78; State v. Pawtuxet Turnpike Co. (1867), 8 R. I. 521, 94 Am. Dec. 123; People v.
Oakland Co. Bank, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 285.
"Trustees of Dartmouth College v. \Voodward (1819), 4 Wheat. (17 U. S.), 518,
1 \Vilgus, Corp. Cas. 708.
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Philadelphia,87 no such power now exists with us in any executive
or judicial office. And since the American revolution the power to
create corporations, with us, has resided in our legislative bodies ex
clusively.88 Such power, however, when in our legislatures, is quali
fied only by constitutional limitations.89 And in the absence of con
stitutional provision the legislature may act by special or general
laws. General incorporation laws probably existed at Rome.00 In
England the first general incorporation law was enacted by Parlia ment
in 1597 for the erection of hospitals; this was made perpetual in 1624;
it is still in force, and Lord COKE, in his Second Institute gives the act
and a proper form for incorporation under it.91 The political dogmas of
the American and French revolutions, that all men are created equal,
and are entitled to equal rights, issued in the demand for equal
privileges in the formation of corporations.
To satisfy this demand and prevent the fraud and legislative job
bery incident to the granting of the privileges of incorporation by
special acts, it became the policy to incorporate under general laws.
As early as 1784, general laws were passed in New York for the
incorporation of Churches; these were followed rapidly in other
states. In r8u, New York passed the first general incorporation law
for incorporating manufacturing corporations. This was fol lowed in
Massachusetts in 1836; in Connecticut and Michigan in 1837; and by
Indiana in 1838.9 2
But passing general laws did not meet the whole difficulty, for the
legislatures continued to create corporations under special acts.
Constitutional limitations therefore became necessary. In 1821 New
York required the assent of two-thirds of the members of both houses
of its legislature.
In 1838 Florida by constitutional provision forbade the incorpora
tion of churches by special act, and directed that a general law be
enacted for their creation. In 1845 Louisiana did the same for all except
municipal corporations. In 1846 New York did likewise;
sr Mc Kim v. Odom. 3 Bland Ch. (Md.) 407, 1 Wilgus Corp. Cas. 222; 1 Wilson's Works.
(Andrews' Ed.), 561; Machen, Modern Law of Corporations, p. 3, note 3·
Poorc's Charters Vol. 2, p. 1388, Par. 14 (North Carolina).
""Franklin Bridge Co. v. Wood (1853), 14 Ga. So, I Wilgus, Corp. Cas. 279,
note 286.
""Bell v. Bank of Nashville (1823), Peck (7 Tenn.) 269; Penobscot Boom Corp. v.
Lamson (1839), 16 Me. (4 Shep) 224, 33 Am. Dec. 656, 1 \Vilgus, Corp. Cas. 283; 1 Hamilton's
Works, iii; 1 Wilson's Works, 561; Luxton v. North River Bridge Co. (1894), l 53 U. S.
525.

oo Baldwin, Modern Political Institutions, Freedom of Incorporation.
•1 39 Eliz. Ch. 5 (1597); 21 Jas. 1, Ch. 1, (1624); 2 Inst., p. 723; 6 Encyc. of Laws
of England 233•
.. Note (b) 2 Kent's Com. p. [342]. Laws of New York 1784, 7 Secs., Ch. 18;
Laws of N. Y., 18II, Ch. 67, 3 Secs. Notes I and 2, I Machen, Corp. p. 15.
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and now almost every state constitution provides that the legisla
tures shall pass no special act creating corporations or conferring
corporate powers, but all corporations shall be created under general
laws which shall be subject to amendment and repeal by the legis
lature at any time.03 Mr. FROST says special charters can be granted
in only seven state s.04

In speaking of the general incorporation laws, J\fr. l\L\CHEN says, "The
statutes in some states consist of a jumble of old acts thrown together
almost indiscriminately with more recent amendments. In other states,
the legisatures have intended to display the utmost lib erality; but
unfortunately this disposition has often been evinced by removing
salutary restrictions and at the same time, in order to
make a show of legislative regulation, by imposing vexatious and
unreasoning restraints." 0
1r. FROST says that "a great majority of the business corporation
acts in force in this country today are sadly in need of revision.
* * * The incorporation laws of Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Mary land
are veritable "legal antiques," * * * and the acts of many of
the states are "wonderfully and fearfully made." 96 And every law yer
that has tried to find out the real meaning of the corporation statutes of
a single state, knows that such mild expressions are alto
gether too euphonious to do the subject justice.
Not only are incorporation laws notoriously uncertain in mean ing,
but they are inflexible so long as they last, and when, in what way, and
to what extent, they will be changed by the legislature,
Providence only, if anyone, can tell.
Then again one must at his peril substantially comply with the
law whether he can determine its meaning or not; and in many states
if he fails so to comply he can only say some sort of disaster will follow,
exactly what under the present state of authorities, he
cannot tell, for it is concealed in gremio legis et curiae; in one place
it will be de facto existence ;97 in another not ;98 in one a full part nership
liability for members; in another an individual liability for participant
s,1 00 - but for all, even though they acted in good faith, it will be
something different from what they intended.
• Private Corporations, \Vilgus, p. u8, Const. Fla. 1838, Art. 13, Sec. 1; Louisiana Const. 1845; New York Const. 1821, Art. 7, Sec. 9; Const. 1846, Art. 8, Sec. 3.
°' Frost, Incorporation and Organization of Corporations, p. 2 (4th Ed).
'° Machen, Corp. p. 17,
00 Frost, Inc. & Organ. Corp. pp. 3, 7 (4th Ed.).
"Finnegan v. Noerenberg (1893), 52 Minn. 239, 38 Am. St. Rep. 552, 1 Wilgus,
Cases, 614.
IAI Kaiser v. Lawrence Sav. Bank (1881). 56 Ia. 104, 1 Wilgus, Cases 607; Berge•
ron v. Hobbs (1897), 96 Wis. 641, 65 Am. St. R. 85, 1 Wilgus, Cases 611.
.. :Martin v. Fewell (1883), 79 Mo. 401, 1 Wilgus, Cases 673, note 676,
100 Fay v. Noble (1851), 7 Cush. (Mass.), 188, 1 Wilgus, Cases, p. 677, note 681.
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Then too it is difficult, if not impossible, unless the Supreme
Court has passed upon it, to say what is the period of corporate
gestation, when it begins or when it ends, when corporate birth really
occurs, when corporate parturition is complete, when the um bilical
cord is cut, and the corporate "personality'' is acquired. For example,
where the statute reads that "articles of incorporation shall he
executed stating name, purpose, place of business, term,
number of directors, names of those for first year, amount of cap
ital stock, and number of shares, and shall be filed in the office of the
secretary of state, and thereupon the signers shall be a corpora tion," at
least four different views are taken: (1) Corporate life for all
purposes begins immediately on filing the articles, ipso facto eo
i11sta11ti, without reference to any stock subscription or organiza tion.101
( 2) There is no corporate life until corpdrate r,rganization.
by election or appointment of officers. 102 (3) There is only a quali
fied corporate existence resulting from filing articles and adult cor porate
life only after the requisite stock is subscribed and paid in.103
(4) Corporate life begins on the filing, but the incorporators whether
subscribing for stock or not, are tenants in common of the proposed
amount until it is duly subscribed by others.104

Creation of E.rpress Trnsts.
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Upan the other hand the creation of an express trust is a matter
of the mere declaration of the tmstor or declarant, accepted by the
trustee, or of a contract between them.105 There are no special stat
utes to comply with except the Statute of Frauds, the Statute of
Uses, statutes relating to Perpetuities, and to Conveyancing and Re
cording.
These will be considered in other connections. At this point it is only
necessary to say that for !:he most part these are easily com plied with.
The Express Trust is a matter of a declaration of an owner or of an
agreement between parties under their common law rights and can be
moulded to suit the needs an-: wishes of the par
ties, and it can be made as certain, definite and clear as the skill of the
draftsman will permit in expressing the intentions o: the par
ties,106-and it will at least not be defeated by incorrect gues!:es at
the meaning of uncertain, if not inconsistent, provisions of written law.
The balance here certainly is in favor of the trust.
101

Singer Mfg. Co. v. Peck (1896), 9 S. Dak. 29, 67 N. W. 947, 1 Wilgus, Cases 571.
alton v. Oliver (1892), 49 Kans. 107, 33 Am. St. R. 355, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 565.
""'Wechselberg v. Flour City National Bank (1894), 24 U. S. App. 308, 1 Wilgus,
Cases, 574.
1°' Hawes v. Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. (1869), 101 Mass. 385, 1 Wilgus, Cases 581.
too Maitland, Equity, pp. 53-56.
'"" lb., 57-70.
102 W
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Steps in Creation of Corporations.
Mr. FROST enumerates107 the various steps necessary to create a
corporation under modern business corporation acts, as follows:
(I)
The drafting of the articles of incorporation;
( 2) The signing of the articles by the requisite number of incor
porators, and the acknowledgement of the same before an officer
<luly authorized to take such acknowledgements;
(3) Filing and recording the articles with the proper state and county
officials after payment of the requisite organization tax and filing and
recording fees;
( 4) Organization of the corporation ready for the transaction of
busine,;s;
( 5) Securing ·the necessary permit from state officials ( if any is
required), to transact business in the domiciliary state.
Steps in Creation of Trust.
On the other hand a recent case has said the requisites of a valid trust
are: " (I) A designated beneficiary; (2) a designated trustee,
who must not be the beneficiary; (3) a fund or other property suffi
ciently designated or identified to enable title thereto to pass to the
trustee; and (4) the actual delivery of the fund or other property, or
of a legal assignment thereof to the trustee, with the intention of passing
legal title thereto to him as trustee."108
Let us consider these things a little more fully in reference to the
creation of Corporations and of Trusts.
The focorporation Paper.
Under all general incorporation laws, some kind of a document
must be executed in a particular way, and filed, deposited, or record
ed, in a specific way. The name of this document is various,-"deed of
settlement," "articles of association," "articles of incorporation,"
"articles," ';certificate of incorporation," "charter," "memorandum of
association,"-all of which Mr. 1\focmm considers objectionable, and
suggests that "incorporation paper'' be used, although as he says, that
"term does not seem to have been used in any state or country." 100 It
seems however that it is not fatal to call it Articles of Association
when it ought to be called " Charter." 110
Frost, Inc. and Org. Corp., p. 12 (4th Ed.).
Brown v. Spohr, 180 N. Y. 201, 209, 73 N. E. 14, 16; Central Trust Co. v.
Gaffney, 142 N. Y. S. 902, 905, 157 App. D. 501. Kemmerer v. Kemmerer (1908), 233
Ill 327, 122 Am. St. R. 169, 84 N. E. 256; Ranney v. Byers (1908), 219 Pa. 332, 123
Am. St. R. 66o, 68 Atl. 971.
100 Machen, Corporations, p. 30, I 32.
110 Kaiser v. Lawrence Sav. Bk. (1881), 56 Ia. 104, 1 Wilgus, Cases 6o7, on 6o8.
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In any event there must be a written or printed incorporation paper.m
The drafting of this document, under printed forms, that are usually
furnished upon application seems to be a simple matter, and is often
done without much professional consider:ition. How ever since the
document, will constitute, together with the law under which it is
executed, a contract of a dual nature,-one between the
corporation and the state, and another among the shareholders them
selves,11 to be construed "rig-idly in favor of the public and against the
corporation ;"11 3 and since the express powers of a corporation are such
as are found expressed in the statute under which the cor poration is
to be forn1ed, or such, as though not so expressed, may be lawfully
claimed, if specified in the incorporation paper. though not otherwise,
much skill is required to get the best results.rn Mr. FROST enumerates
28 different classes of express pO\vers, 21 of which are expressed in
most general laws, but 7 of which if desired. must
usually be claimed in the incorporation paper, if they can be had at
all ;m and, although formerly it was held that one state could not spawn
its corporate progeny to do business in another state, yet that
view has been abandoned so completely that the states have become
unseemly competitors in vending their corporate wares, to such an
extent that every important business seeking incorporation asks where
can the incorporation be had with a maximum of power, and
a minimum of_ inconvenience; so where to incorporate has become
a question of extreme importance, and can be answered only par tially
by any lawyer after careful investigation and comparison of statutes.
Mr. FROST suggests 21 ciuestions to be answered in this connection, and
these certainly do not cover more than half the ground; all these
considerations make it certain that the proper drafting of important
incorporation papers requires a high degree of
skill and experience.U6
The incorporation paper must be executed as the statute provides,
and there are many pitfalls here also. If the statute sa ·s that "any
number" may form a corporation, by signing articles of association,
and stating, among other things, the "names and residence'' of the
signers. and there are 27 signers, but only two state their residences,
the corporation in Indiana, at least, is not de jure;m so too if the

= Utley v. Union Tool Co. (1858),

11 Gray (Mass.), 139, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 597.
ilachen, Corporations, pp. 32-33 ; Wilgus, Corp. Cases, p. 707 et seq.
UJ Oregon Ry. Co. v. Oregonian Co. (1888), 130 U. S. 1, 1 Wilgus, Cases, p. 429.
114
Machen, Corporations, H 48-63, 64-102.
110
Frost, Inc. & Org. of Corporations, 4th Ed., U 17, 18, pp. 34-36.
11
• lb. I 18, p. 35.
Wilgus, Corporations, I 49.
m Busenback v. Attica &c. Road Co. (1873), 43 Ind. 265, 1 Wilgus, Cases, p. 600.
112
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residence of directors is omitted when the statute requires it; so
where the ''principal place of business" is to be stated, it won't do to
say "the operations of the company are to be carried on"11 8 in a certain
county; and in :Maryland it seems that even a church, though it has
been running as an incorporated body for years, taking a deed for its
property, giving a mortgage upon it, issuing bonds, etc., can
not be held liable for its just debts, if its articles were acknowledged
before only one justice of the peace, when two were required. 110 And
in \Vi consin, where the statute requires the certificate of organiza tion
to be filed with the register of deeds,-and where the original
certificate of organization was left with the recorder, long enough
to be recorded in his office, and was so recorded by copying in the
record books, and was then returned to the supposed corporation,
instead of being left on file in the recorder's office, there was neither
a corporation de jzire nor de f acto.1 0
Then too the incorporation fee, varying from a few dollars in
some states to a large sum in others must be paid, or there is, at least,
in Colorado, neither a corporation de j11re, de facto nor by esto pp el.121
In Arizona it would have cost $45 to incorporate the United States Steel
Corporation; it cost $220,000 in New Jersey; and it would have cost in
Pennsylvania, $3,666,666.122
I have already spoken sufficiently of the variety of view, and con
flict of authority as to when the corporate organization is complete. and
real corporate birth occurs. Under the statutes of many states certain
things must be done before the corporation can "commence business,"
and there has l;ieen much difficulty to determine the result of a failure
to do all these things. Perhaps it is reasonably safe to say that if the
duty to do these things before commencing business is placed by the
statute upon those seeking incorporation, such will be a mandatory
condition precedent to valid corporate existence : whereas if the duty
seems to be rather upon the corporation, instead of those seeking
incorporation, it will be a condition subsequent; but in either case the
state can bring quo warranto, in the one case against the unsuccessful
incorporators, in the other against the de faulting corporation, disaster
being possible in either case.123
ua Harris & Stickle v. McGregor (1865), 29 Cal. 124, 1 Wilgus, Cases, p. 6o3.
m Boyce v. Trustees &c. (1876), 46 Md. 359, 1 Wilgus, Cases, p. 642.

:uo Bergeron

121 Jones

v. Hobbs (1897), 96 Wis. 641, 65 Am. St. R. 85, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 611.
v. Aspen Hardware Co. (1895), 21 Colo. 263, 52 Am. St. R. 220, I Wilgus,

Cases, 637.
122 Frost, Inc. & Org. Corp,, 4th Ed., Table iii.
uo Mokelumne Hill Mining Co. v. Woodbury (1859), 14 Cal. 424, 73 Am. Dec. 658,
1 Wilgus, Cases 296; Harrod v. Hamer, (1873), 32 Wis. 162, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 586.
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Trust Instrument.
Now let tts see how it stands with an Express Trust. MAITLAND says:
"In the old days no deed, no writing was necessary to create a use,
trust or confidence. I enfeoff you, and by word of mouth I
declare that you are to hold to the use of X. You must hold to the
use of X. As to trusts this still is law, except in so far as it has been
altered by the Statute of F rauds." 1 24
The Statute of Frauds of 1677, provided (§ 7) that "All declara
tions of or creations of trusts or confidences of any lands, tenements or
hereditaments shall be manifested and proved by some writing signed
by the party who is by law enabled to declare such trust, or by his last
will in writing, or else they shall be utterly void and of no effect," but
by section 8, this was not to apply where the trust results "by the
implication or construction of law." 1 2
It is to be noted here that this statute applies only to real property,
aud not personal property ;1 26 that writing only, not a deed, no sealed
instrument, no witness, no acknowledgement is necessary; and fur ther
no writing is necessary to create the trust, but only to manifest and
prove it "The statute will be satisfied if the trust can be man
ifested and proved by any subsequent acknowledgement by the trust
ee, as by an express declaration by him or by a memorandum to that
effect, or by a letter under his hand, or by a recital in a deed exe cuted
by him ; and the trust, however late the proof, operates retro spectively
from the time of its creation."1 21 But Courts of Equity
went further and held "the Statute of Frauds does not prevent the proof
of fraud," and "it is a fraud for a person who knows land has been
conveyed to him in trust, to deny the trust and claim the land himself." 1 28
In a few states this section of the Statute of Frauds is not in force,
and in a few, a deed instead of merely a writing is required, but in
most states the statute is in force with the effect above given.1 29
As noted it does not apply to personal property, nor does it require
a contract or consideration to make one a trustee.130
The 9th section of this statute however required that every grant
or assignment of a trust, that is the beneficial interest, "be in writing,"
12' Maitland, Equity, p. 57.
'"' 29 Chas. II, c. 3. Maitland's Equity, p. 57; Ranney v. Byers, (1908), 219 Pa.
332, 123 Am. St. R. 660, 68 Atl. 971; Ames, Cases, I 8, pp. 176-189.
"° Maitland, Equity, pp. 58-59.
m Lewin, Trusts, 11th Ed., p. 56; Maitland, Equity, p. 58.
121 Maitland, Equity, 59; Rochefoucauld v. Bonstead, (1897), 1 Ch. 196.
121 Cook, Trusts & Tusttees, I 53; Ames, Cases, pp, 176-177.
130 Maitland, Equity, p. 53; Cook, Trusts & Trustees, §I 45-47.
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an<l not merely manifested or proved by a w riting. 1 31 So too the I
3th Elizabeth forbidding all conveyances to delay, hinder or de fraud,
creditors: and the 2ith Elizabeth forbidding voluntary con veyances to
defraud and deceive subsequent purchasers, of course,
apply to conveyances in trnst as well as to other conveyances. These
:i.re generally in force in this country -132
To quote M,\ITL\ND again: "The creation of a trust may be a
perfectly unilateral act, there may not be more than one party to it.
,:, * " I declare myself a trustee of this watch for my son who is in
India. If I afterwards sell that watch, although my son has never
heard of the benefit that I had intended for him, I commit a breach
of trust and my son has an equitable cause of action against me." 1 33
While it is usually said that "no one can be compelled to undertake
a trust," yet because courts of Equity have been so jealous of its
pet, L\ITLAND points out "In practice it would not be very sage to
rely upon this doctrine, for one may very easily do something or say
something that can be regarded as an acceptance of the trust" with all
its attendant duties, that cannot be easily got rid of. "There
fore if you hear that anyone has been conveying property to you as
a trustee, and you do not wish to be burdened with a trustee's duties,
you will be wise in repudiating in some emphatic manner the rights
and the duties which were to have been thrust upon you." 134
Ko specific words are necessary. "The words 'use' and 'trust' are
not sacramental terms." In fact "the most untechnical words," mere
precatory words, such as "desire," "will," "request," "entreat," "be
seech," ''recommend," "hope," "do not doubt," have been held suffi
cient in wills ; all that is required is a reasonably clear expression
of the decla rant. 135
The Statute of Uses, 27 _Henry VIII, 1535, provided that the legal
estate should follow the use, so that the beneficiary should thereafter
become the legal owner. It read that wherever one person "was seized
of land to the use of another," in fee simple, or fee tail, or for life,
or for vears, the latter shall be deemed to be in lawful, seizin, estate,
an l possession, of such land in such like estate as he had in the use.
1 0
It is to be noted (I) The Statute does not apply to chattels personal.
(2) Nor does it apply to leaseholds for years, that is where the estate
in the tmstee is for years, since seizin applied
111 Maitland's
112 Bispham,

Equity, p. 58.
Equity, II 241, 250. 1•
Maitland, Equity, pp. 53·54... Maitland, Equity, pp. 55-56.
,.. Maitland, Equity, pp. 38, 66; Kemmerer v. Kemmerer (1908), 233 Ill. 327, 122
Am·. St. R. 169, 84 N. F,. 256; Ame•, Cases, pp. 77-10;; Kenneson, Case•, pp. 16-21.
1
•
Maitland, Equity, 35; Kenneson, Cues, 34,3;.
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only to freeholds; but on the other hand if land is conveyed to A and
his heirs to hold to the use of B for 1,000 years,' this use is executed and
B becomes the legal owner, not of the fee, but of the term of years; but
if B assigns it to X to the use of Y, the latter will have only an
Equitable estate. (3) Again the Statute does not apply where there is an
acti.:e trust. "I convey land unto A and his heirs, to the use that they
shall sell the land and divide the proceeds among my children, or upon
trust that they shall so sell and divide. The Stat ute has nothing to say
to this case. You do not find one person seized in trust for another
person, you find A seized upon trust to make a
sale." The test seems to be, does the instrument merely tell A that
B is to have the enjoyment or does it impose upon A some special duty
in regard to the property as to manage and control it, and col lect and
pay the profits to the beneficiary?; if the latter the trust is active, not
passive, and the Statute of Uses does not thrust the legal title on the
beneficiary. (4) Finally after Tyrrell's Case in 1557, it was held that
the Statute exhausted itself in executing the first use, and so, in the case
of a use upon a use, it did not execute the second use.1 7 This however
is a matter that applies to conveyancing.
Again no filing or recording of the tmst instrument is necessary to
make the trust valid, at least as to the parties or those who know or
ought to know of its existence or terms. 138
The trust deed in the Sugar Trust case provided that "The cus tody
of the deed was to be in the president of the board, with sole and
independent control, and not to be shown to any corporation, firm or
person whatsoever except by express direction of the
board." 139 If it is required to be put in the form of a deed, as in
some states, then, of course, it must conform to the statutes relating
thereto, and ,those relating to registration and recording such deeds,
in order to furnish constructive notice. But these rules are simple,
definite and certain, and easily complied with.14° Unless the trust is to
do business in an artificial name, or as a partnership, and there are
statutes requiring registration, there are no other statutes except in a
few states, affecting the creation of trusts, except those relating to
perpetuities. These will be referred to in other connections.
Again no fees are to be paid to the state, or other officers, except
recording fees when the instrument is a deed of conveyance. Of course
if the leg-al estate in land is conveyed in trust, the rules relat• ing to the
conveyance of the legal title to the trustee, apply just the
Maitland, Equity, 35-38; Tyrrell's Case, 2 Dyer, 155a, pl. 20, Kenneson, Cases, 37.
''" Carson v. Phelps, (1873), 40 Md. 73.
1n People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co., (1890), 121 N. Y. 582, 18 Am. St. R. 843,
1 Wilgus, Cases, 100.
0
"
39 Cyc. 55-56.
ur

c;ame as thev apply to a conveyance of land to any other party. And in
general vhatever rules apply to the transfer of any particular kind of
property, to another person, will apply when such is to be conveyed to
a trustee in t rust.1 41 And a promise to create a volun tary trust will not
be enforced. The rules we have been discussing apply only to the
creation of the trust estate itself.
It seems here again that the balance of simplicity so far as formal
ities of creation are concerned is in favor of the trust.
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Parties to Be Incorporated:
Coke's second requisite of corporate existence was parties to in
corporate, and he indicated that these might be either natural or arti
ficial. It seems now that the latter, i. e. corporations cannot, unless
authorized expressly or by necessary implication be either an in
corporator or member of another corporation.u1 General incorpor
•
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ation laws contemplate incorporators and members. The former are
persons, in the case of business corporations, whose function it is to
bring the corporation into existence under the statute; they
may or may not themselves become members by taking stock. When
the corporation is organized, their functions, as incorporators, cease.a
2
On the other hand the members are those who become such by
ownership of stock, and in the beginning, this ownership is acquired
through a subscription. If this is made after the corpora tion is created,
and capable of contracting, the ordinary rules of con tract may apply.m
In most cases, however, there can be no corporation until mem bers
are secured, and this must be either before or contemporan eously with
the coming into existence of the corporation. This sit uation has
puzzled the courts exceedingly. There are numerous views; ( 1) Such
a preliminary agreement has no force and effect, unless it strictly
conforms to the statute, as signing and acknowledg ing the
incorporation paper ;iu ( 2) That it is a valid contract from the time the
requisite amount is subscribed, from which a party can not thereafter
withdraw and which is enforceable against the estate of one, who dies
before the corporation comes into existence and accepts it ;14 5 (3) That
such a preliminary subscription is a mere withdrawable offer, revocable
by death or insanity, at any time be fore the corporation comes into
existence and accepts it expressly or
• Continued from December issue.
ma Denny Hotel Co. v. Schram (1893) 6 Wash. 134, 36 Am. St. R. 130, 1 Wilgus,
Cases, 5s 3. Note, lb., p. 88g.
, .. Nickum v. Burkhardtt, (1897) 30 Ore. 464, 6o Am. St. R. 822, 1 Wilgua, Cases, 391.
1" Southwestern State Co. v. Stephens (1909) l;J9 Wis. 616, 131 Am. St. R. 1074,
29 I,. R. A. (N. S.) 92, 120 N. W. 408.

M< Sedalia, Warsaw etc. Co. v. Wilkerson, (1884) 83 Mo. 235, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 459;
Coppage v. Hutton (1890) 124 Ind 401, 'l I,. R. A. 591, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 469.
, .. Tonica & Petersburg R. R. Co. v. McNeeley (1859) 21 Ill. 71, 1 Wilgus, Cases,
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impliedly ;uc (4_) That such a subscription is a mere withdrawable
offer to the future corporation, but a contract among the subscrib
ers.1H vVhere the courts have not already passed on it, it is impos
sible to tell which view they will take. Of course if all1 goes well, and
the corporation is duly formed and accepts the subscriptions made,
they will be binding, but until that time there is always great
uncertainty from the possibility of death .or withdrawal of a sub
scriber. The difficulty of the courts is that ''it takes two to make a
contract," and, since the corporation cannot be bound until it comes
into existence and has proper officers to bind it, the other party cannot
be bound. To get around this view subscriptions are some times made
with a trustee for the unborn corporation, which a court
of equity will enforce in its favor whenever the corporation comes
into existence.14

Parties to a Trust:
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This again shows the simpler theory that underlies the trust. If
A gives money or other property to B, in trust for C, or even if
A declares that he holds money or other property in trust for C,
C whether in existence at the time or not, whenever he comes into
existence, at least if within the rule relating to perpetuities, can
enforce the trust in equity. In other words only one party or person
is necessary to declare a trust ; all the trustee has to do is to accept
it expressly or impliedly, and the beneficiary does not have to do
that. All that is required is for the settlor to express an intent to create
a trust, and designate some one a trustee, and some one a beneficiary.1t
9

Of course this declaration of trust must be distinguished from a gift.

If I write a letter to my son saying "I give you my Blackacre estate, my

lease-hold house in the High Street, the sum of £1000. Consols standing
in my name, the wine in my cellar," this does not create a trust, nor
does it.make a valid gift for a letter will not oo to
make such conveyances; even if I execute a deed covenanting to
convey and assign these things, there is not yet a trust nor a perfect gift,
and the reason is "I make it clear I do not intend to make my1'" Bryant's Pond Steam Mill Co. v. Felt (1895) 87 Me. 234, 47 Am. St. R. 323, 1
Wilgus, Cases 474.
HT .Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co. v. Davis, 40 Minn. 110, 12 Am. St. R. 701,
3 L. R. A. 796, 41 N, W. 1026, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 492. Nebraska Chickory Co. v. Led·
nicky, (1907) 79 Neb. 587, 113 N. W. 245.
"" San Joaquin Land Co. v. West (1892) 94 Cal. 399, 29 Pac. 785, 1 Wilgus, Cases
497; West v. Crawford (1889) So Cal. 19, 1 Wilgus, Cases 500.
,.. Ames, Cases, note p. 213; Kenn son's Cases, p. 89, 28 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of
Law, p. 1100.
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self a trustee, I mean to give" instead, and an intention to give, with
out delivering the gift is not a gift. "The two intentions are very
different, the giver means to get rid of his rights, the man who is
intending to make himself a trustee intends to retain his rights but to
come under an onerous obligation." "An imperfect gift is no
declaration of trust." 1; o
''Every person who can hold and dispose of any legal or equit able
estate or interest in property, may create a trust in respect of such estate
or interest,''-the state, a private corporation, married women, an infant
at least till he avoids it, and aliens and non-resi dents.1"1 Still further
it is the constitutional right under the Fed eral constitution of a citizen
of one state to constitute a citizen of another state a trustee of his
property real or personal,
wherever the property is located. The Indiana statute forbidding
this was declared unconstitutiona l.15 2
So too any kind of property may be held in trust; real, personal,
legal, equitable, in possession or in action, (if assignable), in re
mainder, reversion, or expectancy, domestic or foreign, can be the
subject of a declaration of trust, subject to the rules above given.1" 3
Any one capable of holding property, may be a trustee, an infant,
married women, corporation, or alien, or even a person of unsound
mind. And in the case of an infant or lunatic, trustee, a court of
equity can vest the title in some suitable person to carry out the
trust. One of several beneficiaries may be a trustee if the settlor
so appoint s.15 4
So too any one can be a beneficiary,-infants, married women,
corporations, unincorporated bodies, residents or non-residents,
any one capable of taking and holding any kind of property and no
acceptance by the beneficiary is necessa ry.1 55
The other three requisites of corporate existence named by Lord
Coke,-name, place, and proper words, along with some others are
provided for under general laws in the Incorporation Paper. This
usually requires (I) the name, ( 2) the place, ( 3) the purpose, ( 4) the
capital stock, (S) the number of directors, and (6) the duration
, .. Maitland, Equity, pp. 73, 74.
llll 27 Am. & Eng. Encyc., 1st Ed. 13.
m Scars, Trust Estates etc., p. 1q4; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Chicago etc.
Ry. Co. (1886) 27 Fed. Rep. 146; Roby v. Smith (1891) 131 Ind. 342, 20 N. E. 1093.
,., 27 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 1st Ed. 24, 25. Note, Ames, Cases, p. 193.
, .. 27 Am. & Eng. Encyc. ISi Ed. 16, 17; Cook, Trusts & Trustees,
IIO·II8.
1"' 27 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 1st Ed. 23; Ames, Cases, pp. 215-231; Kcnneson, Cases, 90-97;
Loring, Trustees Handbook, p. 15 (3d Ed.); Connecticut Riv. Sav. Bank v. Albee (1892) 64 Vt.
571, 33 Am. St. R. 944.
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The purpose of course of this Incorporation Paper

is to give definite form to a particular corporation,-to make spe
cific for a single corporation what is general and applicable to all
orporations of that class.
Although as we have seen no formal instrument is necessary to
the creation of a valid trust, yet in the cast of an express trust for
business a deed or declaration of trust is drawn up: (I) Providing
for a name; ( 2) Designating trustees, and providing for their suc
cession; (3) Providing for the raising and conveying the trust res or
fund to the trustees, and defining their rights, powers and duties in
reference thereto; (4) Providing for the issue of transferable
certificates to those who are the cestuis que trust, in proportion to
their respective beneficial interests in the property and profits; (5)
Providing for division of profits; (6) Limiting liability of trustees
and beneficiaries; (7) Fixing the duration, and providing for .disso
lution at the termination of the t rust.1 67
These are so similar to the requirements of the incorporation paper
that they may be taken up in order and COJl?.pared with some detail.
Corporate Name:

It was long ago said that the corporate name is a baptismal one, and
of the very. befng of the corporate constitution. It is now universally
required to be stated in 'the incorporation paper, although it perhaps
could be acquired under the common law by user. When rightfully
acquired the corporation is considered as having a fran chise therein,
with the same exclusive right to its use in the incor porating state that
it would have in a trade mark, including the right to enjoin its use
by another domestic corporation. In several states particular
provisions exist in relation to the selection and publication of the
corporate name that must be strictly complied with. It has been held
that a change of corporate name without au thority, makes the
members liable as partners. 1 8

Trnst Name:
Jn the absence of a statute forbidding, a natural person may do
business in his own name or in any name he pleases to assume as a
business name, so long as it does not infringe another's right in a
''" 1 Wilgus,

Cases, pp. 435-440.
Conyngton, Corporate Organization, p. 366.
1" 1 Wilgus, Cases, pp. 816-829.

111
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name already in use by the latter.1 G9 Since the trustees are natural
persons, they may choose such name in which to carry on business
if they so desire, or the name may be, probably should be and usually
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is designated in the deed of trust, as for example, a trust deed in
which Richard Olney, l\foorefielJ Storey and William F. Beal are
trustees (and therefore likely to have been drawn with the utmost
legal skill) provides: "49. The trusts of these presents may be col
lectively designated for all purposes thereof as the Old South Build ing
Trust, and the Trnstees may for the like purposes be referred to as the
Trustees of the Old South Building T rust."100
Another signed by similarly distinguished lawyers, provides;

duct
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ed
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"First. The trustees, in their collective capacity, shall be designated, so
far as practicable, as the ".l\fassachusetts Electric Companies," and
under that name shall, so far as practicable, conduct 11 business and
execute all instruments in writing, in performance of their trus t."1
1

Some states have statutes, as has Michigan, providing that "No
person or persons shall hereafter carry on or conduct or transact
business in this state under any assumed name, or under any desig
nation, name, or style, corporate or otherwise, other than the real name
or names of the individual or individuals owning, conducting, or
transacting, such business, unless such persons shall file in the office
of the clerk of the county or counties in which such person or persons
own, conduct, or transact or intend tc own, conduct or transact sl,]ch
business, or maintain an office or place of business, a certificate setting
forth the name or names under which such bus iness owned is, or is to
be conducted, or transacted and the true or real full name or names of
the person or persons owning, conduct ing or transacting the same,
with the home and post office address or addresses of said person or
persons," 1 02 under specified penalty
for failure. By a later provision this was specifically extended to
partnerships, and no change in name shall be made until a new cer
tificate shall be filed giving the facts, the old members remaining liable
until this new certificate is filed.103
This of course would apply to trustees carrying on business under an
artificial name. And presumably, also, if the trnst is so organized
,

.. Sparks v. Dispatch Transfer Co. (1891) 104 Mo. 531, 24 Am. St. R. 351. Note,
Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Cummings, - Ore. -, 133 Pac.

1 32 Am. St. R. 571.
I 169, 47 L. R. A. N.

s. 252.

, .. Cor.yngton, Corporate Organization, Form 62.
•1 1 Sears, Trust Estates, etc., p. 287.
,., Public Acts, Mich. 1907, No. 101, p. ·119.
,.. Public Acts, Mich. 1913, No. 164, p. 286.
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as to make the beneficiaries partners, all their names would have to be
given. This however should and can be avoided. Such state ments as
the above are generally required in annual reports of cor porations, and
are not more onerous than they are.
Corporate Domicile:
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I have already referred to the uncertainty of the statutory provis ions
relating to place or location. Where the New Hampshire stat ute
provided that the incorporation paper should state the "place in
which its business is to be carried on," and the paper drawn by a
supposedly competent attorney, stated "the places of business
were Nashua in New Hampshire, and East Brookfield, in l\Iassa
chusetts," and the manufacturing business was done at East Brook
field, and the corporate meetings held at Nashua, the l\Iassachu setts
Supreme Judicial Court, held there was no corporation de jure, de facto,
or by estoppel, and the treasurer was individually liable
on a note given as the corporation's note. 10 So too corporations are
•

frequently dissolved for failure to maintain a domiciliary office in
the incorporating state, whether the statute so requires or not. It
was formerly held that corporate stockholders' meetings coul<l not
lawfully be held outside of the creating state because in the very
nature of things the incorporating statute conferring such a privilege or
franchise, is necessarily inoperative beyond such state, and out side of
such state the assembled stockholders are possessed of only their
natural powers.166 This doctrine is gradually passing away, and in the
absence of statutory provisions controlling, and with pro visions in the
incorporation paper so authorizing, it is now reas onably safe to hold
shareholders meetings outside the creating state.167 However there are
so many conflicting decisions and statu tory provisions that it is never
wise to advise such to be done.168
Trust Domicile:

Upon the other hand since Trustees act not under any special
privilege or franchise from the state, but under their common law and
constitutional right as citizens of one state to do business there
, .. Montgomery v. Forbes, (1889) 148 Mass. 249, 19 N. E. 342, 1 \Vilgus, Cases, 594- 1..
Frost, Incorporation and Org. of Corp., pp. 64, 65 (4th Ed.).
'"" Miller v. Ewer (1847) 27 Mc. 509, 46 Am. Dec. 619, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 841.
157 Mis90uri Lead etc, Co. v. Reinhard (1893) 114 Mo. 218, 35 Am. St. R. 746, 1 Wilgus,
Cases, 844; Graham v. Boston etc. R. R. (1886) 118 U. S. 161, 1 Wilgus, Cascs, 846, note p.
847.
ioa Machcn, Corp. § 1212.
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or in another, there is no difficulty as to "place of business," and no
place of business· is usually stated, further than to designate the city
in which annual or other meetings are to be held. Here again the Trust
is simpler.16 0
Corporate Purposes:
Incorporation statutes frequently provide for incorporation "for any
lawful pu'rpose" with certain exceptions, usually of a public service
character. There is frequent difficulty in determining wheth er two or
more purposes can be joined in one incorporation paper; the statutes
in some states expressly authorize this; in some states the state
officials so construe their ambiguous statutes; in bthers the statutes
divide business into classes, which cannot be joined; in still
other states only one purpose or general object can be claimed;
while in still others, the name of the corporation must indicate the
various purposes. This serves to indicate the confusion, and the
difficulty encountered here.17° This is mitigated however somewhat
by the rule that things that cannot be properly claimed are mere
surplusage, and can be rejected. This however would not help out
an incorporation paper where two objects are joined when only one is
permitted, but either of which would be valid if standing alone.
Perhaps the corporation would be permitted to elect, and amend the
paper, and thereafter carry on the one line of business elected. In any
event the "object" clauses of ari important corpor ation paper requires
special skill and care in drawing.
Trust Purposes:

i nl y

There seems to be no such difficulty, or in fact no such limitations,
applying to Trusts. They can be created to carry on any lawful business
or businesses desired, one or many as the parties, the declar ants and
the trustees provide for, unless there are express statutory limitations.
They have been created for manufacturing, mining, lumbering,
agriculture, transportation, mercantile, real estate, hold ing shares,
disposing of patents, and numerous other purposes.171 And as we saw
above "Every kind of valuable property, both real and personal, that
can be assigned at law may be the subject-matter of a Trust.m Here
again with equal attention the purposes for which a Trust may be
formed may be more certainly provided for than in similar
incorporation papers.
Forms, given in Sears, Cook (Corp.) and Conyngton (Corp. Organuation).
Incorp. and Organ. Corps., p. 19 et seq.; Machen, Corps., ti 46-108.
m Sears, Trust tates etc., p. a53.
112
Perry, Trusts, 6th Ed., I 67.

•1 See
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For instance in the l\fassachusetts Gas Companies, the declara
tion of trust authorized its trustees to engage: ( r) in manufacturing,
buying, selling and dealing in coal, oil, coke, gas and all products
thereof: (2) in manufacturing and supplying gas or electricity or any
other agent for light, heat, power or other purposes; (3) in ac quiring;
owning, managing, exchanging, selling and dealing in the stocks,
shares and securities of corporations, trusts or associations, engaged in
whole or in part in any business above mentioned, or in owning and
operating railways or railroads or transporting pas sengers,
merchandise, mails or express matter, or in manufacturing, selling or
repairing machines, equipments supplies or other articles used by
corporations, trusts or associations of any of the classes
above mentioned. * * * * (4) in any business similar in character to
that above mentioned which the trustees may deem expedient." and
to acquire, hold and dispose of the stocks of such in stitutions. 1 ·
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Corporate Stock:
The theory of the capital stock of a corporation is that the power to
have such, or increase or decrease it, is a corporate franchise, and
must be expressly conferred by the state, or otherwise it does not exist.1
74
Incorporation statutes frequently fix maximum and mini mum
limits, and sometimes limit indebtedness to the amount of capi tal
stock, also special provisions are almost always made in reference to
increase or decrease of the same, otherwise unanimous consent of
shareholders, as well as the consent of the state would be neces
sarym
.
Under all the incorporation laws, the incorporation paper
must state the number of shares, and the par value thereof ( except
now in New York) and these cannot be changed except by an
amendment made to the articles of incorporation. In the absence of
statutory provisions preventing, in the original organization of the
company, preferred and common stock may be provided for in the
incorporation paper, but not so afterward except by uanimous consent,
unless there are statutory provisions making other regula tions.176 In
several states as in Michigan the statutes provide for a certain kind
of redeemable pref erred stock with a limited dividend; in such states
other kinds of preferred stock, or with greater divi dends cannot be
provided for. In some states the statute. because
171 Sears, Trust Estates, p. 303.
"'Cooke v. Marshall (1899) 191 Pa. St. 315, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 761.
m Railway Co. v. Allerton (1873) 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 233,

Wilgus, Cases, 442,
note 763.
m Keht v. Quicksilver Mining Co. (1879) 78 N. Y. 159, I Wilgus, Cases, 790, note
793; Campbell v. Zylonite Co. 121 N. Y. 455.
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the common law was otherwise, expressly provides "that each share
holder shall be entitled to one vote for each share held." In such a
state can non-voting preferred shares be created? This is answer ed
differently in different jurisdictions.177 In some states there is a
statutory liability attaching to the ownership of stock, and our Supreme
Court has just held that when a corporation organized in
one state having no such statutory liability, is expressly authorized
to do business in a state having such liability the shareholders be come
liable thereon for business done in such state.178 This makes stock
holding in corporations organized to do business throughout the
United States a precarious matter.

Trust Stock:
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How is it with Express Trusts? Can they be created with a cap
ital stock represented by transferable shares? Or can the property held
in trust by the trustees be represented by shares issued by the trustees,
transferable, so as to give purchasers the same rights as original
beneficiaries?
There is no doubt now, but that at Common Law, under merely their
power to .contract, individuals may between themselves engage in
business together, each contributing property thereto, and take
certificates representing their interests, which they may if the agree
ment so provides transfer to others. For 100 years or so, 1720 to
1825, the English Bubble Act forbade this, but this was repealed in
England, and was never, or if at all, only to a very limited extent in
force in this country. The courts in this country have held from
the beginning that this could be done,170 and now hold, that although by
constitutional provisions "corporations can be created only under
general laws" and corporation is defined in the constitu tion to "include
all associations and joint stock companies having any of the powers
and privileges of corporations not possessed by individuals or
partnerships," and there is no statute authorizing the creation of joint
stock companies with transferable shares, still, such institutions can
be created by contract among individuals under the exercise of their
common law rights and not be corporations. Such was the holding in a
well considered Idaho case, following many similar decisions in other
states.1 80 There is therefore no law against doing this. Still further we
have already seen that the inll1 State v. Swanger, 190 Mo. 561, 89 S. W. 892; Colonial Printing etc. Co. v. Duns•
muir, 32 Can. Sup. Ct. 679.
171
Thomas v. Matthiessen (1913) 232 U. S. 221.
1" 1 Wilgus, Cases, note p. 175. Sears, Trust Estates, fl 52-54,
190 Spottswood v. Morris (1906) 12 Id. 360, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 665, 85 Pac. 1094.
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terest of a beneficiary is substantially a property right inheritable,
descendible, and transferable as other rights are. The 9th section
of the English Statute of Frauds required an assignment to be in
writing; and since the beneficiaries' rights are not those of joint or cotenants in the trust fund, but wholly incorporeal and intangible,
just what the trust declared provides, the most natural way to rep
resent them is by a certificate, and the most natural and convenient way
of transfer is by an assignment of the certificate. In Estate of
Oliver, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, held that the interest of
the stockholder "was an interest in the profits made. He had no
title to the land bought by the trustees for the company, as a tenant
in common or otherwise and could neither convey nor encumber it. His
interest in it was personal estate and -the extent of that interest was
shown by his cerificate of stock." 181
The following are illustrations of the stock provisions in a few
Trusts:-

"Central Massachusetts Light and Power Co. The beneficial in
terest in the trust created by its agreement and declaration of trust is
divided into 6,500 preferred shares and 6,500 common shares. The
latter have no par value. The former have a par value of
$100, are entitled to cumulative preferred dividends of 5 per cent the
first year and increasing thereafter yearly to 6 per cent after
May 15, 1918. The preferred shares have a preference in liquida
tion and are entitled to $1JO if the trust is terminated within two
years, and to amounts increasing thereafter yearly up to $125 if the
termination occurs after May 15, 1918."182
The Worcester Railways and Investment Company issued "nego
tiable certificates or evidences of interest for 60,000 shares, each
share representing a fractional beneficial interest of 1/6oooo in"
its property, the trustees having discretion to fix the dividends there
on.1ss
The capital of the Massachusetts Light and Traction Companies,
is "divided into 100,000 shares of the par value of $1.00 each,
bearing 5 per cent. non-cumulative dividends, to be designated as
"preferred A stock," 50,000 shares of the par value of $5.00 each,
bearing 6 per cent. non-cumulative dividends, to be designated "pre
ferred B stock," and 10,000 shares of the par value of $25,000, of
common stock."184
Oliver's Estate (1890) 136 Pa. 43, zo Am. St. R. 894.
Report (No. 1788 House) of Special Commission, Mass., on Voluntary Associa·
tions (1913) p. 40.
111 lb. p. zo.
'"lb. p. 44181
181
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It would seem again here that the Express Trust is much more fltxible
than the usual corporation provisions are in reference to shares, there
being no state to interfere, or statute to follow, anri the
· whole matter can be moulded to suit the parties, and may be changed
in any way or at any time, in accordance ·with such provisions as may
be inserted in the trust agreement. The only point of difficulty here is
in reference to partnership liability, a matter which is considered later
on.
Corporate Directors:
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Statutes usually require the number to be stated, and when once fixed
can be changed only by an amendment regularly adopted. Statutes also
usually require them to be shareholders to the extent of a few shares.
Being elected there is no power of removal, unless expressly provided
for in the statute, incorporation paper, or by laws. By perhaps all
business corporation statutes there mmt be directors, and in them the
ordinary powers of the corporation are vested. 1 86 They however have
no legal or equitable title to tne cor
porate property. They act only in duly called meetings. 187 Their
functions are sui generis, and have been likened to those of agents,
trustees or mandatories of the corporation, but perhaps they are strictly
neither. 188 Directors, however, are not agents of the share holders, and
except in certain peculiar situations are not generally said to be in a
position of trust toward them.1 89 Courts are not in accord upon the
degree of care and diligence required of directors, one line of
authorities saying that the care and diligence that an ordinarily prudent
man takes of his own business, is required, while another line of
authorities says, since they get no pay, no greater care is required than
that required of a gratuitous bailee.19 0
They have no authority to sell or dispose of the corporate capital or
property, except such as is properly done in the ordinary course of
business. For defaults of the directors affecting all the share
holders alike, they are primarily liable only to the corporation, and
In the Matter of Election of Directors, 63 N. J. L. 168, 2 \Vilgus, Cases, p. 1744,
'"" Blood v. La Serena, 113 Cal. 221; Metropolitan Elev. R. R. Co. v. Manhattan El.
Ry. Co. (1884) 11 Daly (N. Y.) 373, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 694, note 702.
'"' Bank of Little Rock v. McCarthy ( 1892) 55 Ark. 473, 29 Am. St. R. 6o, 1 Wilgus,
Cases, note 850.
, .. Allen v. Curtis (1857) 26 Conn. 456, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1727; Ellis v. Ward (18go)
137 Ill. 509, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1729; Wallace v. Lincoln Sav. Bank (1891) 89 Tenn. 630,
24 Am. St. R. 625, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1731.
See "Purchase of Shares of Corporation by a Director from a Shareholder," by
H. L. Wilgus, 8 Mich. Law Rev. (Feby. 1910) p. 267.
1'° North Hudson Building & Loan Assn. v. Childs (1892) 82 Wis. 46o, 33 Am. St.
R. 57, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1737. Sec also 2 Wilgus, Cases, pp. 1874-1888.
1
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only when they so control the corporation as to prevent it from bringing
a proper action to protect itself amounting to a substantial breach of
trust, can the shareholder bring a representative suit in equity to prevent
a failure of justice. Courts of equity have no
special jurisdiction over directors merely as such. It is only when
there is a breach of trust upon their part, that they can be called to
account in equit y.191
Trustees of Trusts:

In case of the Trust, the Trustees stand, so far as control and
management are concerned, if the Trust agreement so provides, in a
position somewhat analogous to that of directors in a corporation. They,
however, exercise control, because they are the owners of the property,
and not the agents of the beneficiaries, or of any one else. They act as
owners, but as owners that are obliged to render an account in equity
not merely to all the beneficiaries as a whole,
but to each and every beneficiary; for the beneficiary's right is in
dividual, and in personam, and enforceable in equity primarily, not
secondarily, against the trustee.1 92
A trustee has whatever estate either legal or equitable is neces sary
for him fully to carry out the trust created but no further ;1 93 and ( 1)
"A trustee is bound to do anything that he is expressly bid den to do
by the instrument creating the trust. (2) A trustee may safely do
anything that he is expressly authorized to do by that in strument, even
loan or invest money without adequate security.
(3) A trustee is bound to refrain from doing anything that is ex pressly
forbidden by that instrument. (4) Within these limits a trustee must
play the part of a prudent owner and a prudent man of business,"
not as if he had himself alone to consider, but also "for the benefit of
other people for ,vhom he felt morally bound to provide."19
• other hand, however, just because the trustee is owner
Upon the
of the property, if the trustee dies intestate his estate devolves upon his
heir or personal representative if he had a fee; so also he can devise the
estate, or convey it inter vivos;19 in fact "At law the trustee has all
those powers of alienating inter ·vi·vos, mortgaging and
1111 Dodge v. Woolsey (1855) 59 U. S. (18 How.) 331, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 88; Hawes
v. Oakland (1881) 104 U. S. 450, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1716.
111 Ames, Cases, pp. 235-278.
,... Reichert v. Missouri & Ill. Co. (1907) 231 Ill. 238, 121 Am. St. R 307, 83

N. E. 166.

'" Maitland, Equity, p. 98; Cook, Trusts & Trustees, I 127; Whiteley v. Learoyd,
33 Ch. D. 355, 12 A. C. 722, 25 Eng. Ru!. Cas. 326.
191 Maitland, Equity, pp. 86-go.
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so forth that he would have were there no trust in existence," but of
course any heir, devisee, executor, administrator or party taking with
notice is Loun<l by the trust. To prevent these results several trustees
arc appointed to hold as joint-tenants, with its attendant surv
iYorship.106
Unlike directors the act of a majority of trustees does not bind the
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minority., all must join in a conveyance, or· in a receipt. They are not
at all agents for one another, nor can one shelter himself by saying he
was out voted, if he, nevertheless, acquiesced in the action taken.197
Of course, however all of these matters can be modified to suit
the wishes of the settlor.
The following from the declaration of trust of the l\fassachusetts Gas
Companies,-a manufacturing tmst,-indicates what may be
done :10 8
"The trustees shall hold the legal title to all property at any time
belonging to this trust, and subject only to the specific limitations
herein contained, they shall have the absolute control of the conduct
of all business of the trust; and the following enumeration of spe
cific d,1ties and powers shall not be construed in anyway as a limi
tation upon the general powers intended to be conferred upon them.
"The Trustees shall have authority to adopt and use a common
seal ; to make all such contracts as they may deem expedient in the
conduct of business of the trust; from time to time to release, sell,
exchange. or otherwise dispose of, at public or private sale, any or
all of the trust property, whether real or personal, for such prices
either in cash or the stocks, shares, or securities of other corpora tions.
trusts or a sociations and upon such terms as to credit or oth erwise as
they may deem expedient; to guarantee or assume the ob ligations of
other corporations, trusts or associations and to enter into such
agreements by way of indemnity or otherwise as they may deem
expedient in connection with the acquisition of property from the
subscribers as hereinbefore provided or otherwise; to confer, by way
of substitution, such power and authority on the President, Treasurer,
Secretary, and Executive Committee, and other officers and agents
appointed by them, as they may deem expedient; to bor row money for
the purposes of the trust and give the obligations of the Trustees
therefor; to loan any money from time to time in the
Maitland, Equity, p. 93.
••• Reichert v. Missouri etc. Coal Co. (1907) 231 Ill. 238, 121 Am. St. R. 307, 83
N. E. 166; :Mattison v. Mattison (1909) 53 Ore. 254, 100 Pac. 4, 133 Am. St, R. 8:z9; Adams'
Estate (1908) :z21 Pa. 77, 7a At!. 438, 128 Am. St. R. 7:z7, Estate of Fesmire, 134 Pa. St. 67,
19 Am. St. 676.
''" Sears, Trust Estates etc., p. 303.
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hands of the Trustees, with or without security, on such terms as
they may deem expedient; to subscribe for, acquire, own, sell or oth
erwise dispose of such real or personal property including the stocks,
shares, and securities of any other corporations, trusts, or associa tions,
as they may deem expedient in connection with the purposes of the
trust; to vote in person or by proxy on all shares of stock at any time
held by them, and to collect and receive the income, interest, and profits
of any such stock or securities; to collect, sue for, re ceive, and receipt
for all sums of money at any time becoming due
to said trust; to employ counsel and to begin, prosecute, defend, and
settle suits at law, in equity or otherwise, and to compromise or re fer
to arbitration any claims in favor of or against the trust; and in general
to do all such matters and things as in their judgment will promote or
advance the business which they are authorized to carry on, although
such matters and things may be neither specifically authorized nor
In
incidental to any matters or things specifically author ized.
addition to the powers herein granted the Trustees shall
have all power with reference to the conduct of the business and
management of the property of the trust which are possessed by
directors of a manufacturing corporation under the laws of l\Iassa
chusetts.
"So far as strangers to the trust are concerned a resolution of the
Trustees authorizing a particular act to be done shall be conclusive
evidence in favor of strangers that such act is within the power
of the Trustees; and no purchaser from the Trustees sh.all be
bound to see to the application of the purchase money or other con
sideration paid or delivered by or for said purchaser to or from the
Trustees.
"Stated meetings of the Trustees shall be held at least once a
month, and other meetings shall be held from time to time upon the
call of the President or any three of the Trustees. A majority of
the Trustees shall constitute a quorum; and the concurrence of all
the Trustees shall not be necessary to the validity of any actioQ
taken by them, but the decision expressed by a vote of a majority of
the Trustees present and voting at any meeting shall be conclusive."
Other provisions authorize the adoption of by-laws, election of
officers, and executive committee, and agents, accepting resignations,
removing officers, filling vacancies, keeping records, etc.
Also "The Trustees shall not be liable for any error of judgment or
for any loss arising out of any act or omission in the execution of
this trust, so long as they act in good faith, nor shall they be per sonally
liable for the acts or omissions of each other, or for the acts or
omissions of any officer, agent, or servant elected or appointed by
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or acting for them ; and they shall not be obliged to give any bond to
secure the due performance of this trust by them.
"Any Trustee may acquire, o,vn, and dispose of shares in this trust
to the same extent as if he were not a Trustee."
Corporate Life or Duration:
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\Ve have seen that corporations were often said ,to be immortal.
This of course meant that there was continuous or perpetual suc
cession for an indefinite and unlimited time unless the corporation
was dissolved in some of the ways known to the law,-loss of all
members, act of Parliament, surrender of franchises, or quo war
ranto for misuser or non-user. 10 This is still the law, unless there
are constitutional or statutory provisions to the contrary, but there
are such in nearly ever state, the limit fixed being usually from 20 to
50 years, and in many cases the proposed duration must be stated in
the Incorporation Paper. In many states a renewal may be had for a
like period. With us the Legislature has no right to dissolve unless the
power to do so is reserved to the State.200 However, through quo
warranto proceedings for violation of duty injurious ly affecting the
public, the courts may pronounce judgment of dis solution.201 During
the whole of its prescribed life, the corporation is said to have
perpetual or continuous succession, and remains the same corporation
regardless of any change in membership.
Trust Duration:
In this respect, because of the "rule against perpetuities," the
corporate organization seems simpler than the Trust form. This rule
in all its applications is exceedingly intricate and technical, and
frequently papers, especially wills, drawn by the best lawyers have
contained provisions that have been rendered ineffective because
offending against the rule. In the matter of an ordinary business trust,
however, while perhaps a perpetual or immortal existence can not be
acquired, an existence that is as long as or in many cases much longer
than the ordinary corporate life can be obtained.
The English rule seems to have two branches, one relating to the
vesting of future estates, and the other to trusts for accumulations.
These may be stated: (1) "Every future contingent estate limited
''" State v. Payne (1895) 129 Mo. 468, I \Vilgus, Cases, 830; Hoston Glass Manulac•
tory v. Langdon (1834) 24 Pick. (Mass.) 49, 35 Am. Dec. 292, I \Vilgus, Cases, 866.
200 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518, I
\Vilgi,s, Cases, 708.
0•0 People v. Dashaway Association (1890) 84 Cal. 114, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1298.
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to arise on an event that might possibly happen later than 21 years
and the period of gestation af1ter the death of persons living at
the creation of -the estate is void the day it is created.'' 202 ( 2) "vVhere
property, real and personal, is given to trustees to hold and to receive
and invest the rents and profits of the real property and the income of
the personal property, and to deliver the property and income at a certain
or contingent future time to the beneficiaries, if
that time may possibly happen more than 21 years and the period of
gestation after the death of persons living at the creation of the trust,
the direction to accumulate and the gift of the accumulated fund are
void absolutely." 203
Neither of these rules \-vould seem to prevent the creation of trusts
for indefinite periods, as A grants property to B in fee to control and
manage for C in fee, for each estate, the legal and equitable, is
vested in the respective parties, and they together may at any time if
they choose terminate the trust, and together convey an absolute title to
the property.20
A recent writer however has said "The courts in this country seem
to be moving very rapidly toward the general announcement of the rule
that trusts of absolute indestructible equitable interests can not be
made to last for longer than lives in being and twenty one years, and
that any provision which may by any possibility postpone
the term of the trusteeship for longer than that period is wholly void
from the beginning." 20
It has been held in Illinois that where the trustees have the abso lute
power to sell at any time free of the rights of the beneficiaries, the rule
does not apply ;206 and likewise in Massachusetts, if the in come is not
to be accumulated, but distributed as it accrues, and where the whole
equitable interest is at every moment vested abso lutely in the
shareholders, and can be sold by them at any time, the rule does not
apply ;207 but if the trustees and beneficiaries cannot together convey
the complete title without violating the trust, the rule is violated. 208
In New York the statute provides that "Every future estate shall
be void in its creation which shall suspend the absolute power of
alienation for a longer period than two lives in being. * * * Such
,., Rood, History of Real Property Law, I 27.
203 18 Am. & Eng. Encyc. (1st Ed)
pp. 381-382.
,.. Gray, J. C., Ruic against Perpetuities, 2d Ed. (1906) I 236.
"'"Kales, Transfer of Title to Real Estate, I 72.
""Hart v. Seymour (1893) 147 Ill. 598.
201 Howe v. Morse (1899) 174 Mass. 491, S5 N. E. 213.
""Winsor v. Milli (1892), 157 Mass. 362; Young v. Snow (1897) 167 Mass. 287.
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power of alienation is suspended when there are no persons m being
by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed." Under this
statute it has been held that if the trust term is longer than the period
of two lives in being, but the trustees have at all
· times the power to convey the complete title neither the rule nor statute
is violated.209 And where the trust is for the sole benefit of the settlors
or their appointees, the rule does not apply, even though the
beneficiaries are infants, or are numerous, and the entire inter est
cannot be disposed of without their consent.210
In New York, lV[ichigan and Minnesota, the period seems to be
two lives only; in Wisconsin, two lives and 20 years; in California,
Idaho, North and South Dakota, the period is fixed by lives, in
being at the creation, but there is no limitation as to number; in all
other states the period is a "life or lives in being and 21 years there
after."211 The lives specified may be those of trustees, existing
beneficiaries or strangers.212
The following are illu trations: The term of the Boston and Wor
cester Electric Companies is "twenty years after the death of the
last· survivor of 27 persons named in the agreement and declara
tion."213 In the Massachusetts Electric Companies "The· trust is
to continue for the term of 21 years from the date of the agree
ment, unless the holders of at least two thirds of the shares then
outstanding shall at a meeting called for that purpose vote for its '
termination or continuance."214 The Massachusetts Northern Rail
ways put it: "The trust·is to continue for the term of twenty years
after the death of the last survivor of ten persons" named, six of
whom were the sons and daughters of the other four, three of whom
were trustees; but at any time by a vote of 2/3 of the outstanding
shares in a meeting called for the purpose, confirmed by the vote of
5/7 of the trustees, the trust can be terminated, and the property be
distributed, or be sold and proceeds distributed. 21
As has been pointed out a succession of trustees can be kept up by
means of joint tenancies, or by provisions in the trust-deed, or if
necessary to prevent failure by appointment of a court of equity,
N. Y.

""'Robert v. Corning (1882) 8g N. Y. 225; Henderson v. Henderson (1889) 113
1.

21•Beardsley v. Hotchkiss (1884) 96 N. Y. 201; N. Y. ife Ins. Co. v. Livingston
(1892) 133 N. Y. 125; Hope v. Brewer (1892) 136 N. Y. 126; Holmes v. Walter (1903)
u8 Wis. 409; Williams v. Montgomery (1896) 148 N. Y. 519.
211 Sears, Trust Estates etc., pp. 137-138.
212 Crooke v. King's County ( 1884) 97 N. Y. 421; Bailey v. Bailey (1884) 97 N. Y.
460.
m Report of Special Com ittee of Mass. House Reps. No. 1788, p. 7.
"• lb. p. 8.
Ill lb. p. 15.
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for it is a maxim that a trust shall not fail for want of a trustee.216
So too if there is not a special confidence in the person, instead of in
the office, of the trustee, no additional conveyances are necessary
to keep up; the succession of powers, rights and duties in the trustees.21
A little care in the drawing up the trust instrument may make the
trust as convenient in this regard as the corporation. 218
This brings us to a consideration of the corporation and trust
obligations and liabilities. Here are important differences, in theory,
and great care is necessary in drawing trust agreements or there is
danger of unexpected or unusual liabilities.
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It results, of course, that because a corporation is a separate
person in the law, that its rights and obligations are its own, and not
those of any other persons. And this doctrine obtains universally
except when this corporate personality is used to "defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime."210 It
follows of course that if the corporation is properly organized, and the
shareholders and officers do all they should do, and do nothing they
should not do, no one is liable except the corporation for any
obligations incurred. The theory is that the creditor must look to the
capital ,ttock of the corporation for his protection; and this capital
stock is frequently called a "trust fund" for the protec tion of
creditors. 220
Yet this trust fund doctrine has been bitterly
assailed, and it is held there is no liability on officers and share
holders, in the absence of statutory provisions, unless there is
actual or constructive fraud, or ultra vires, or tortious or illegal acts
upon their par t. 21 Of course it is agreed that if there is a trust
fund, it is peculiar, unlike ordinary trust funds, since there is no
0•1 Reichert v. Mission etc. Coal Co. (1907) 231 111. 238, 121 Am. St. R. 307; Dodge
v. Dodge (1908) 109 Md. 164, 71 Atl. 519, r30 Am. St. R. 503, note 508; Smith v.
Davis (1891) 90 Cal. 25, 25 Am. St. R. 92; U. S. Casualty Co. v. Kaccr (1902) 169
Mo. 301, 69 S. W. 370, 92 Am. St. R. 641.
211 Kadis v. Weil (r9r3) r64 N. C. 84, 80 S. E. 229. Compare Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Safe Deposit Co. (r91I) rr5 Md. 339, Ann. Cas. 1913 A 1279, note.
218
See Jiorms given in Scars, Cook (Corp. 7th Ed.), Conyngton (Corp. Organ.).
2U Smith v. Moore (1912) 199 Fed. 689. Sec also 10 Mich. Law Rev. 310; 12 Col.
Law Rev. 496.
""'Wood v. Dummer (1824) 3 Mason 308, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1847; Scovill v. Thayer
(1881) 105 U. S. 143, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1907; Shields v. Hobart (1903) 172 Mo. 491, 95
Am. St. R. 529, 72 S. W. 669221 O'Bear Jewelry Co. v. Volfer (1894) 106 Ala. 205, 54 Am. St. R. 31, 2 Wilgus, Cases,
1852; Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. Co. (1892) 4,8 Minn. 174, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1911; Hall v.
Henderson (1900) 134 Ala. 455, 63 L. R. A. 673.
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separation of' the legal and equitable titles, and no special trusts and
confidence existing between the corporation, corporate officers, or
shareholders, and corporate creditors. The corporation owns the whole
title iegal and equitable to corporate property and the creditor
has, merely as shch, no lien upon it either at law or in equity, at
least before insolvency. 222 And so it is held by the great weight of
authority ( in the absence of bankruptcy laws forbidding) that a
corporation can lawfully prefer its creditors, even stockholder and
director creditors, if it chooses, and there is no actual fraud.228
Nevertheless it is to a fund designated capital, or capital stock, and
to that only, that creditors can _look for protection.
There is
however much confusion as to exactly what is included in this
fund. It perhaps can now be safely said to include all the corporate
property, real, and personal, tangible and intangible, choses in
possession and in action, up to an amount equal to the face value of
the outstanding stock, but yet not to that extent, if the corporate
capital has been dissipated by misfortune, and not by fault of re
.
sponsible partiesm
There is however yet some uncertainty as to holding shareholders
liable for unpaid stock, or for stock issued for overvalued property, or
for dividends paid out of corporate capital.
New York has just held that under the law of that state share holders
in the absence of an agreement to pay up their stock, can not be held
by creditors to pay up. 226 As to payment of stock by property, one line
of authorities holds that in the absence of actual fraud, established by
the complainant, the judgment of the direc tors is final,226 as where
the three dummy incorporators and direc
tors holding $3,000 of stock in the U. S. Steel Corporation, under
the New Jersey law passed a resolution that the property proposed
to be turned over to the company was equal in value to the face value
of the stock and bonds, $1,410,000,000 to be issued for it. The
Government experts however think there was $700,000,000 water in
it. Another view is that it is only a quegtion of fact to be determined
by a jury when the question is submitted to them upon the facts put
before them, and good faith will not protect;
m Hollins v. Brierfield Coal Co. (18g3) 150 U. S. 371, 2 Wilgus, Caaes, 1868.
Catlin v. Eagle Bank (1826) 6 Conn. 233, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1815; Corey v. Wads•
worth (1897) 118 Ala. 488, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1836. Compare Rouse v. Merchants Natl.
Bank (1889) 46 0. S. 493, 15 Am. St. R. 644, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1819; Olney v. Conanicut
Land Co. (1889) 16 R. I. 597, 27 Am. St. R. 767, :a Wilgus, Cases, 1832.
224 Am. Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ferguson (1913)) 66 Ore.. 417, 134 Pac. 1029; In
re Wells Estate (1913) 156 Wis. 294, 144 N. W. 174.
m Southworth v. Morgan (1912) 205 N. Y. 293.
::.-. Graves v. Brooks (1898) 117 Mich. 424, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1950.
:21
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another rule is that a large difference in the actual value of the
property and the face value of the stock issued is prima facie evi
dence of fraud and calls for explanation ; 21 and still another view
is that if the corporation is a "going concern," but nearly "gone,"
stock may be issued at a discount to takers in order to see, if per
chance, it may be revived, at the expense of subsequent creditors.228
So, too, while it was originally held that the directors could not pay
dividends to shareholders out of the corporate capital, yet our Su
preme Court has held that where shareholders receive such dividends
in good faith, supposing they were properly declared and paid out of
profits instead of capital they may keep them,229 and the creditor must
whistle through the corporate whistle to the defaulting direc tors to
make good their loss.
Then too there are statutory efforts to protect creditors, which for
the most part are satisfactory to nobody. These are attempts
to make officers and stockholders liable for corporate debts under
such varying circumstances that it is difficult to tell what the liability
is, whether penal or contractual ,230 primary or secondary,231, limited or
unlimited, separate or joint, or on prior, existing, or subsequent
shareholders,m and whether enforceable outside of the state or no
t.234 So too many states provide that all "fictitious issues of stock
or bonds shall be void," yet courts have had great difficulty in giving
effect to such provisions, for if the effort to issue stock at a dis
count is z,oid, the statute would then hurt creditors more than in any
other way, and defeat its own probable purpose. 235 On the other hand
Montana has a statute that provides that stock may be issued
for mining property taken at any value, and such stock shall be
deemed to be wholly paid up. 236
m See cases cited in State Trust Co. v. Turner (1900) 111 Ia. 664, 82 N. W. 1029, 53
L. R. A. 136, 2 Wilgus, Cases. 1953. Compare I Cook, Corp., H 46-47.
'""'Handley v. Stutz (1891) 139 U. S. 417, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1923.
221 McDonald v. Williams (1899) 174 U. S. 397, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1981.
:a Wiles v. Suydam ( 1876) 64 N. Y. 173, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1981.
m Umsted v. Buskirk (1866) 17 0. S. u3, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1990•
.., Hanson v. Donkersley (1877) 37 Mich. 184, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1997.
.., Harger v. McCullough (1846) 2 Denio (N. Y.) 19, 2 Wilgus. Cases, 1998; Dank
of Poughkeepsie v. Ibbotson (1840) 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 473, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 2001;
Foot v. Sinnoclc (1887) 120 Ill. 350, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 2003; Zang v. Wyant (1898) 25
Colo. 551, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 2005.
234 Marshall v. Sherman (1895) 148 N. Y. 9, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 2021; Howarth v.
Angle (1900) 162 N. Y. 179, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 2028; Whitman v. Oxford Bank (1900)
176 U. S. 559, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 2018.
Van Cleve v. Berkey (1898) 143 Mo. 109, 42 L. R. A. 593, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1953.
Compare I Cook, Corp., § 47.
•• Civil Code of Montana, § 3824, (Mar. 7, 1895).
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(a) Trustees liability: As has been pointed out, in a Trust, the
tru5tees are the owners of the property to the extent of any estate
necessary for them to have under the instrument of trust to enable them
fully to execute it. If it therefore gives to them full control,
management, and disposition of the property, they acts as owners
do, as principals and not as agents of others. 237 It would naturally
follow from this that they bind themselves personally and themselves
alone, in the absence of some provision to the contrary. The debts
they incur are their personal debts, not those of the beneficiaries,
nor of the trust fund. 238
As was said by the United States Supreme Court in Taylor v.
Dm•is,239 ''\Vhen an agent contracts in the name of his principal,
the principal contracts and is bound, but the agent is not. \Vhen a
trustee contracts as such, unless he is bound no one is bound for
he has no principal. The trust estate cannot promise; the contract
is therefore the personal undertaking of the trustee. As a trustee
holds the estate, although only v,·ith the power and for the purpose
of managing it, he is personally bound by the contracts he makes as
trustee, e\'en when designating himself as such. * * * Of course
when a trustee acts in good faith for the benefit of the trust he is entitled
to indemnity himself for his engagements out of the estate in his
hands." As for instance where a broker secured a loan for the trustee
for the benefit of the estate, the trustee promising to
pay the commission out of the trust fund, it was held that the trust estate
was not liable, but the trustee was personally.2 0 And so where a note
signed by A. B. Trustee, was taken by the payee with
knowledge that it was for the benefit of the estate, yet the trustee
was held personally liable.20 Hill on Trustees states the rule "A trnstee
who carries on any trade with the trust assets for the benefit of the
cest11is que trust will be responsible to the creditors, not only to the
extent of the trust assets but also with the whole of his own

09)

''" Loring, Trustees Handbook, pp. 25-29; Ames, Cases, 2d E<l., pp. 278-281; Ken·
neson, Cases, pp. 14;•152•
... J,oring, Trustees Handbook, pp. 29-31; Dunlevie v. Spangenberg (1910) 121
N. Y. S. 299, 66 Misc. 354.
11
"Taylor v. Davis (1884) 110 U. S. 330, 335.
"'" Johnson v. Leman (1890) 131 Ill. 609, 19 Am. St. R. 63, note 67; Connally v.
Lyons (1891) 82 Tex. 664, 27 Am. St. R. 935°; McIntyre v. Williamson (1900) 72 Vt. 183,
47 Atl. 786, 82 Am. St. R, 929.
241 Roger Williams Natl. Bank v. Groton M{g. Co. (1889) 16 R. I. 504; Mitchell &
Co. v. Whitlock (1897) 121 N. C. 166.
"' Hill, Trustees (Ed. 1846) p. 533; Woddrop v. Weed (1893.) 154 Pa. St. 307, 35 Am. St.
R. 8,12. But see Wright v. Railroad Co. (1909) 151 N. C. 529; Curry v. Dorr (1912) 210
lass. 430, on 432.
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property, and he may be made bankrupt and proceeded against in the
same manner as any other trader, and it is immaterial that the trade is
carried on by him in consequence of an express direction in the trust
instrument; although the trust property will doubtless be primarily
liable to creditors, and will be first applied so far as it will go in
discharge of the liabilities.·•m
·
This of course is directly contrary to the liability of corporate directors,
and is so different that, if it could not be modified·it would
deter competent business men from accepting such trusts. Can a
trustee then exclude such liability by express stipulation to the con
trary? It is clear he can. In Shoe and Leather Bank v. TVood,m it
was held that there was not personal liability upon the trustees where
they had executed a note reading "We as Trustees but not individually
promise to pay," signed by themselves "Trustees ;" and it is rnled, in
the words of the syllabus in Russe'}' v. Arnold, "No action can be
maintained against trustees,
holding· the property
of an
unincorporated association, on a contract made by them which by its
terms is enforceable only against the property held in trust."m This has
been more recently affirm ed.2t 5
Upon the stationery of the Massachusetts Gas Companies, printed in
red ink, there appears the following, "The name 'lvfassachusetts
Gas Companies' is the designation of the Trustees for the time
being under an agreement and declaration of trust, dated 1902, and all
persons dealing with the Massachusetts Gas Companies must look
solely to the Trust property for the enforcement of any claim against
the Companies, as neither the Trustees, Officers nor share holders
assume any personal liability for obligations entered into on behalf
of he Companies."uo In the Old South Building Trust
deed it is provided that "In every written order, contract or obliga
tion which the Trustees shall give, authorize or enter into, it shall
be the duty of the Trustees to stipulate or cause to be stipulated that
neither the Trustees nor shareholders shall be held to any personal
liability under or by reason of such order, contract or obligation."m In
some of the older cases the exemption of the trustee from per sonal
liability was placed upon the right of subrogation of the creditor to
the trustees right of indemnity, and to that alone; so that if the
trust estate was insolvent, or the trustee exceeded his
... 123 Mass. 148 (1877).
,,. 185 Mass. 202 (1904).
.., King v. Stowell (1912) 211 Mass. 246, 251.
"' Sears, Trust Estates etc., p. 320.

"'' Conyngton, Corporate Organization, pp. 548, 556.
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authority the trustee was still personally liable. Perhaps he still is
in the latter case, but not in th'e former.20
But how about the liability of the beneficiaries? This depends

y
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apparently upon whether they are really and truly, and individually,
beneficiaries only, of an existing trust, or whether they are assoc ciated
together in such a way as in fact to be partners engaged in business for
profit, the trustees being not really the owners of the property, but in
substance and truth the agents of the associated beneficiaries. There has
been much consideration given to these matters in Iassachusetts.
In Hoadley v. Commrs, 2¼ 9 the question was whether transferable
shares in a trust were taxable as corporate shares would be, i. e., at the
domicile of the owner, or where the trust property was located. I-1eld,
the latter, since they were shares in a partnership. Here the
parties had "associated themselves to hold property and carry on
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business,'' "as the McKay Sewing Machine Association," but no
member was to have any power to make any contract or transact
any business for the Association, which was itself to be the equit
able owner, and "the general management of the business" was
"vested in an executive committee * * * to be chosen by the
whole body of shareholders at a meeting called by the trustee for
that purpose."
In Gleason v. M cKay, 2 0 the same Association was involved, and
the question was whether the Association should be taxed upon all
its outstanding shares, as corporations were taxed. It was held not,
on the ground it was a partnership, without any corporate franchise,
and so not subject to the tax.
In lVhitman v. Porter,n2 subscribers associated themselves to
gether to buy a ferry boat to be conveyed to one in trust, to be managed
by trustees and officers elected annually by subscribers, who were to
have transferable shares for their interests in the "Agawam Ferry Co.;"
the plaintiff in the case was one of the share holders, who had
advanced money to pay notes given for the pur chase of the boat and
to pay expenses and asked for contribution from the others, over and
above their subscriptions to pay the amount due. Held, it was
substantially a partnership, and "as between themselves they were
ultimately liable in proportion to their interests. But as to creditors,
each was liable for the whole."
... Sears, Trust Estates, p. 40 et seq.; Loring, Trustees Handbook, p. 35.
:u 105 Mass. 519 (1870).
'"' 134 Mass. 419 (1883).
••• 107 ?.Jass. 522 (1871).
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money was raised to carry on the
business of manufacturing grates, by sale of transferable certificates
under deed of trust providing the business was to be carried on by
a board of managers of whom the trustee was one, and the others
were to be elected by the shareholders. Held to be a partnership.
In Ricker v. Am. Loan & Trust Co.,2 3 another
tax case. it was
•
held that where those who provided the money for purchasing and
selling cars, to be paid for in ten payments with six per cent interest,
62

were declared to be an Association with the interests represented by
transferable shares, the business to be managed by a boar<l of
managers named, subject to removal by the shareholders and others
to be elected by them, the title of the property being taken in in
trust by an incorporated trust company, a partnership was created,
subject to taxation as other partnerships.
So too, in William v. Boston,25 where a trust was organized to
•

s,
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purchase the site of the Museum of Fine Arts, to be held by trustees,
who should issue transferable shares to the subscribers, in whom in
meeting assembled, was vested the power to instruct the trustees or
remove them, and to alter or amend the declaration of trust, and to
direct the tmstees to sell the property, and although the deed
specifically stated that neither the shareholders nor the trustees were
to be personally liable for any obligations of the Trust, yet it was stated
that a partnership for taxation purposes was created. In the later
case of Williams v. Milton (infra) it was said this was a mistake, it was
a trust and not a partnership.
On the other hand in Mayo v. .Moritz, 255 an inventor transferred his
invention to trustees, who were to issue to him one-ha!f of a specified
amount of scrip or trans£erable shares, the other half to be issued to
subscribers who should furnish the trustees with money for carrying on
the business. The Trustees were to hold, manage and dispose of the
invention, as they thought best, and vacancies among trustees were to
be filled by the remaining trustees, held this did not constitute a
partnership.
The same view is taken in the still more recent case of TVilliams
v. M ilton. 230 This is also a taxation case. The l\Iassachusetts statute
provides that personal property held in trust, shall be taxed to the
trustee where the beneficiary resides; and partners shall be jointly
taxed in the firm name, where the business is done; the
,.. 137 Mass. 510 (1864).

"°" 140

Mass. 346 (1885).
"" 08 Mass. 497 (1911),
""151 Mass. 481 (1890).
.,..2,5 Mass. 1 (1913).
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business was done in Boston which sought to tax the Trust as a
partnership doing business there.

ents

The trust deed creating this Boston Personal Property Trust,
"expressly declared that a trust, and not a partnership is hereby
created; that neither the Trustees nor the cestuis que trustent shall
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ever be personally liable hereunder as partners or otherwise, but
that for all debts the Trustees shall be liable as such to the extent
of the Trust Fund only. In all contracts or ins'truments creating
liability it shall be expressly stipulated that the cestuis que trustent
shall not be liable."
''The Trustees shall have as full power and discretion, as if abso lute
owners, to invest and reinvest the Trust Fund, in personal property," to
borrow money to extent of 25 per cent of property and
pledge as collateral security any personal property belonging to the
Trust Fund; to declare dividends in their discretion; to render an
annual account; to resign,-vacancies to be filled by remaining
tmstees; to issue transferable certificates; to alter, add to or termin
ate the trust with the consent of three-fourths in interest of the
cestuis que trustent.
The court by LORING, ]., said: "Where persons associate them selves
together to carry on business for their mutual profit, they are none the
less partners because ( 1) their shares in the partnership are
represented by certificates which are transferable and transmis
sible, and because (2) as a matter of convenience (if not of neces
sity in case of transferable and transmissible certificates) the legal title
to the partnership property is taken in the name of a third person. The
person in whose name the partnership property stands in such a case
is perhaps in a sense a trustee. But speaking with accuracy he is an
agent who for the principal's convenience holds
the legal title to the principal's property.
After reviewing the Massachusetts cases above referred to, the
court points out that the difference between the partnership cases, (
the Hoadley, Whitman, Gleason, Phi/lips, Ricker and Williams cases),
on one hand and Mayo v. ,l,forit::: ( the patent case) on the other, lies in
the fact that in the former cases the certificate holders are associated
together by the terms of the "trust" and are the principals whose
instructions are to be obeyed by their agent who for their convenience
holds the legal title to their property. The property is their property.
They are the masters. While in Mayo
v. M orit::: on the other hand there is no association between the cer
tificate holders. The property is the property of the trustee5 and the trustees
are the masters. All that the certificate holders in Mavo
v. M orit:; ha<l, was a right to have the property managed by the
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managers ( the defendants, appellant) was not that of principal and
agent ( though doubtless fiduciary) but that the managers them
selves became the principals in any contract which they might make."
There are many other cases to like effect. It seems therefore that
the usual personal liability of the trustees can be excluded by ex
press provision brought home to every one dealt with; the cestuis
q1te trust, are not partners if the ownership and control of the fund
are left with the trustees; and by express provision brought home to
a dealer the Trust Fund alone can be made liable for the obliga tions
of the trust.
I have referred to the provisions relating to capital stock of a
corporation, and pointed out some of the discordant theories in
reference thereto . It has been, in the main, a struggle between
persons on the one hand who have wished to capitalize visionary
prospective profits before their dreams were in fact realized, and if
disaster came, to get out from under, with some one else in posses
sion of the hot air bag,262 and the State's effort on the other hand to
make the actual capital, in the beginning come up to the manifesto,
or supplement this by other liabilities that frequently work unneces
sary hardship upon honest business. 2G 3 It certainly cannot be said
that the schemes so far devised have been satisfactory. Upon the
one hand they have been insufficient to accomplish their real purpose;
and upon the other, have been too inflexible and inelastic to en
courage- honorable and legitimate enterprise. The careful investor
in shares has difficulty to ascertain from statements of capital stock
much that aids him in getting at real values, while the careless one is
almost certain to be misled. The creditor also is in much the same
predicament. The really careful investor or creditor, relies not upon
the capital stock statements but upon the actual property and course of
business of the particular in stitu tion. 264 The Trust for the most part
proceeds upon a like theory. If one deals with a Trust in reference
to the Trust, it is made his duty in the absence of express provisions
otherwise, and if he has notice that he must look to the Trttst property
alone for security, to ascertain just what that property is, without regard
to any amount of nominal shares that may be issued against it.265 In
other words the shares, few or many, have nothing particularly to do
with the property, but are only the
262 See dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Fuller in Handley v. Stutz (1891) 139
U.S. 417,:: Wilgt,s, Cases, 1923, 1932•
... Machen, A. W., "Do Corporation laws allow sufficient freedom to commercial
enterprise?" Maryland Bar Ass'n Report, 1909, pp. 78-98.
:et See Cook, Corporations, 7th Ed. §§ 46-47 .
... Kisch v. Tozier (1894) 143 N. Y. 390, 42 Am. St. R. 729, note 733.
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method of indicating aliquot parts of the fund for the convenience of
the owners. The investor and the creditor both are expected to act as
business men do, and are required to do, when they are deal ing with
individuals, that is, rely upon their own investigation, knowledge and
judgment.
Different people will take different views as to the best policy,
in this regarct. 00 Recently New York has provided for the issue of
corporate shares without par value, and has recognized the duty of
investor and creditor alike to rely upon his own judgment, instead
of upon the uncertain meaning of a fixed capital stock.267 The
efficiency and validity of blue sky laws are yet "in nubibus," and
make ccrporate capitalization still more intricate,-and cloudy.268
While the right of inspecting corporate books by shareholders 1s now
generally recognized, without any actual controversy being in
volved. such right, in the case of Trusts, can be fully recognized or
regulated by the trust deed provisions, as the stautory or common
law rules permit in the case of corporations.
the Atlantic
Jlfontlzl:,',
a short time
ago, Mr.
F. In
L.an article inmentioned
various
disadvantages
of corporations:
STETSON,

There are, said he ( 1) Taxation,-organization tax, franchist? or
continuing tax, property tax, transfer tax, foreign state tax, and Federal
tax, nearly all of which are now imposed upon corporations, and· in
addition thereto the shares of shareholders are frequently taxecl to the
owner, i'f not in the creating state, certainly to him when he lives in
another state.270 So, too, the franchise tax may be
imposed at home, and another privilege tax in each of the states
where the corporation does business, and these may be and fre
quently are higher than domestic corporations in the same business
pay, for a corporation does business, other than interstate com
merce, in a foreign state. by sufferance, comity as it is called,
rather than by rightm
.
Property of course is taxed wherever it is,
, .. See Burton, T. E., Corporations and the State (1911); Stock \Vatcring, \V. Z. Ripley,
06 Pol. Sci. Q. 98-121 (1911); Capital of Corporations, G. W. Wickercham, 22
Harv. Law Rev. 319-338 (1909); Overcapitalization, 38 Natl. Corp. Rep. 59 (1909); Stockwatering,
i2 Bench and Bar, 43 (1908); Williams v. McClavc (1914) 148 N. Y. S. !J.1""" Shares \Vithout Nominal or Par Value, Victor Morawctz, 26 Harv. Law Rev.

729 (1913).

'

""'Blue Sky Laws, F. A. Updike, 7 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 230-237 (1913); Alabama &
N. 0. 'fransp. Co. ct al. v. Doyle (1914) 210 Fed. 173.
"""no· Atl. Monthly, p. 27 ct seq. (1912), July),
r.o 2 Wilgus, Cases, pp. 1370-1391; Farrington v. Tennessee (1877) 95 U. S. 679, 2
\Vilgus, Cases, 1370.
271 Bank of Augusta v. Earle (1839) 13 Pct. (38 U. S.) 519, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 148o; Manchester
Fire Ins. Co. v. Herriott (1899) 91 Fed. 7rr, a Wilgus, Cases, 1498, note 1502.
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these institutions can be subjected to an excise tax under their
constitution, similar to corpo rations.2a
Trust property is usually
taxed only to the trustee, who may indemnify himself out of the trust
estate.
:Mr. STETSON points out also (2) that corporations are not protect
ed under the 4th and 5th amendments as natural persons are, with
special reference to divulging incriminating information, discrimina

al
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tion against them, as to terms of doing business, and enforcing claims.
So also under the reserved power to repeal or amend cor porate
charters, many limitations and restrictions upon a corpora tion's power
to contract can be and are imposed that would not be valid if imposed
upon citizens of the United States.m So a foreign corporation as a
creditor, unless it has entered a state and complied with its laws in
reference to doing business in the state, is not a person within· the
jurisdiction, so as to be protected under the

,

.

but here the fiction that personal property follows the owner, is often
applied much more rigorously to corporations than to indi viduals.
Shares are also subject to an inheritance tax, in the state where the
deceased lived, in the state where the corporation is in corporated, and
according to some decisions also where the shares are to be
transferred. The transfer tax can be imposed wherever the transfer
is to be made. 272 The Federal tax is now an income tax, and of
course would apply to the income of a Trust as well as
a corporation. The Supreme Court however held that the income
tax of 1909, applied only to such associations "as are organized under
some statute, or derive from that source some quality or benefit not
existing at the common law," and Trusts were not so
organized and have no such quality. 273 In Massachusetts after much
variety of opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court has finally ruled that

r

,,,. Morrison v. Manchester (1879) 58 N. H. 538; Fowler v. Campbell 100 Mich.
398; City of Detroit v. Lewis, 109 Mich. 155, 32 L. R. A. 439; Mills v. Thornton, 26
111. 300, 79 Am. Dec. 377; Matzenbaugh v. People, 194 111. 108, 88 Am. St. R. 134;
Latrobe v. Mayor, 19 Md. 13; Corry v. Baltimore, 96 Md. 310, 196 U. S. 466, 25 S. C.
297; Tappan v. Merchants' Bank, 19 Wall (U. S.) 490; Merriman's Estate, 147 Mich.
630; Estate of Palmer, 183 N. Y. 238; In re Ames Estate (1913) 141 N'. Y. S. 793;
People v. Union Trust Co., 255 Ill. 168; Matter of Cooley, 186 N. Y. 220.
271 Eliot v. Freeman (1911) 220 U. S. 178.
27
• In re Opinion of Justites (1908) 195 Mass. 607, 84 N. E. 490; In re Opinion of
Justices (1911) 208 Mass. 616, 94 N. E. 1043; Compare S. S. White Dental Mfg. Co. v. Commw.
(1912) 212 Mass. 35, 98 N. E. 1056 (Corp.); Keystone \Vatch Co. v. Commw.
(1912) 212 Mass. 50, 98 N. E. 1063 (Corp.); Farr Alpaca Co. v. Commw. (1912) 212
Mass. 156, 98 N. E. 1078 (Corp.); Baltic Min. Co. v. Commw. (1913) 231 U. S. 68,
34 S. C. 15.
State v. Nashville etc. Ry. Co. (1911) 124 Tenn. 1, 135 S. W. 773, Ann. Cas. 1912
D. 805; Hale v. Henkel (1906) 201 U.S. 43; Wilson v. U.S. (1911) 221 U.S. 361;
McGuire v. Railway Co. (1906) 131 Ia. 340.
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clause that says "no state shall deny to any person within its juris
diction the equal protection of the laws." 276 In almost all these
particulars, trustees being citizens of the United States and entitled to
all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states, would
be protected more fully than a corporation.m So too many states
attempt to exclude corporations doing business in the state from suing
in the Federal courts, and while they cannot actually exclude them from
the Federal Courts, they may ou& the offending
corporation from the state.278
:.Mr. STETSON also points out (3) the very great and unjust toll that is
paid by corporations in litigation because of prejudice against them,
exhibited by juries and legislators. In some degree at least this would
be less pronounced in the case of a Trust, where responsible local
citizens of standing were the trustees.
Upon the public side it was noted in the beginning that one of the
crying weaknesses of corporations was the impersonal character, and
the lack of individual personal responsibility, especially toward the
public, that characterized it, and its actions. It might seem that here
the Trust would be superior; and it is more than probable that so far
as the relation of the Trustee toward the beneficiaries, is concerned,
there is under the rules ·of courts of Equity, a much more positive and
direct feeling of personal responsibility.
Toward the public, however, this may be doubted, for we have the
experience that all of our great industrial combinations, good and bad,
have almost without exception originated as Trusts, under Trust deeds
such as we have been describing ;279 and from this form, held by the
New York Court of Appeals, in the Sugar T rust280 case to be illegal
as a partnership contrary to the right of a corporation
to be a member of such, and by the Supreme Court of Ohio in the
Standard Oil Case to be an institution in unlawful restraint of trade,281
those v-:ho then saw the handwriting on the wall fled in
hope to find legal shelter in the corporate form, only to find their
"'' Blake v. McClung (1900) 176 U. S. S9, a Wilgus, Cases, 2045: (1898) 172 U. S.
239, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 2036.
m Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co. (1886) 27 Fed. 146; Roby
v. Smith (1891) 131 Ind. 342, 20 N. E. 1093: Scars, Trust Estates etc., 194.
211 Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co. (1876) 94 U. S. S3S, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1491:
Harrison v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. (1914) - U. S. -, 34 S. C. 333.
211 See I Wilgus, Cases, pp. 957,984. Sec cases in 212 lllass., and 231 U. S. in
note 274 above
"'"People '"· North River Sugar Ref. Co. (1890) 121 N. Y. 582, 1 Wilgus, Cases,
100,

note

109.

"'State v. Standard Oil Co. (1892) 49 0. S. 137, 34 Am. St. R. 541.
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hope in vain.282
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Neither trust nor corporate form where restraint

of trade is the end of the organization, can stand the searching
power of the government to destroy either under the common law or
under the anti-trust acts.283
·Massachusetts has through Commissioners made investigations of
these Express Trusts, and after two reports, enacted legislation pro
viding for the filing with the Railroad Commission of all deeds of trust
for such Associations, and in the case of Trusts for owning
shares in railway, street railway and electric railway companies, or
which are managed by the same parties, making annual reports to,
and making them subject to examination by, the Railroad Commis
sion. The same power is given also to the Gas Commission in reference
to gas, electric light, and power companies.
If the foregoing review is accurate, it would seem that, largely
because of the variety, uncertainty, and confusion arising from con
flicting legislative provisions, the Tmst form of organization, at
least upon the private side, is more simple, certain, consistent and
yet flexible, and perhaps with even more satisfactory safeguard.
available both to the investor and the creditor, than is the corpora tion.
Upon the public side, however, so far as control is concerned, the
State can reach an offending corporation more directly and posi tively,
notwithstanding the Trust form of organization was abandoned for the
corporate form, with the belief that in that way
anti-trust laws could be evaded.
So far as any feeling of direct personal responsibility toward the
public as a whole rs c;oncerned, there does not seem to be much
difference. The psychology of the group mind seems to be inherently
different from that of a single individual. It will seek and accomp lish
ends from which individuals will shrink. As the non-explosives,
glycerine, nitric and sulphuric acids and saw-dust mixed, make the
explosive dynamite, so does the combination of the intelligent, the
stupid, the selfish and unselfish, the honest and the dishonest, into one
group, give a resultant that when quiescent usually does much better
than the worst, yet from hidden powers often does much worse than
the worst. 286 Undoubtedly much could be done to make
m
978.

Distilling & Cattle Feeding Co. v•. People (1895) 156 Ill. 448, 1 Wilgus, Cases,

,,.. Northern Securities Co. v. U. 5. (1903) 193 U. 5. 200; Standard Oil Co. v.
U. S. (1910) 221 U. S. 1; L'. S. v. Am. Tobacco Co. (1910) 221 U. S. 106•
.,.. Sec chapters 454, 509, and 596 of Public Acts of 1913.
211 Distilling and Cattle Feeding Co. v. People (1895) 156 Ill. 448, 47 Am. St. R.
1 \Vilgus, Cases, 978.
""' LeBon, The Crowd, pp. 2-44.

-63our corporation laws, more simple, certain and flexible; and a properly
worked out Federal incorporation law would help corpora tions with
extensive business in many respects, and furnish a model
for state legislation.
\Vhen laws are uncertain, or unduly hamper legitimate enterprise,
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bright minds will invent methods to accomplish unexpected ends.
In the early years of our history, there was great prejudice against
the incorporation of banks, and there were either no laws permi•tting
it or if there were any, they were such as were difficult to comply
with. The brilliant services of Alexander Hamilton, and of Aaron
Burr were called in requisition to devise plans for the institution of
banks in New York City. Hamilton drew up a masterly paper which
with a- few words changed-directors to trustees, shareholders to
beneficiaries, and a few others, would still be a model form for a
Trust for business purposes, such as we have been considering, an<l
which was the constitution of the Merchants Bank for 20 years, until the
legislature forbade banking in any but the corporation form. On the
other hand Aaron Burr engineered a bill through the New York
legislature to incorporate a company to supply the city of Kew York
with water, and with authority to use its surplus capital "in
any way not inconsistent with the laws and constitutions of the
United States and New York." Under ithis charter, so it is stated,
the Manhattan Bank has been carrying on business for 115 years.288
These perhaps are typical illustrations as to what lawyers are
calied upon to' do, and the methods sometimes resorted to. The one
statesman-like, constructive, and within the law. The other un
statesman-like, destructive, and if within the law at all, only so by
taking advantage of its uncertainty, to thwart the expressed will of
the people.
Perhaps these things can never be wholly overcome until men are
made over. All production is the result of the combination of forces
within man, with forces and •things outside him, of persons and
property. From the beginning of time some men in whom the sense
of brotherhood was latent or unborn, have always classed other men
as external things to be used or exploited as other property, and have
considered it proper to take all that their strength, their wit or their
cunning enabled them to take; others have believed that they should
take no more from the common fund than thev had contributed to it;
still others that -they should contribute to it all their ability and their
skill would enable them to
""'Hamilton's \Vorks, vol. 7, pp. 838-844; Sears, Tntat Estates, etc., p. 341.
""Century Magazine, May, 1899; Parton'• Life of Burr, p. 238.
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do, and take from it only what they needed. There is no doubt but
that the trend of the ages has been practically from the first of these
toward the second, and perhaps in the more recent years of -the
Christian era, there has been a trend ideally at least, if not much
practically, toward the third. As one or the other of these ends are
dominant so will the nature and the administration of the laws be. And
so will the institutions founded upon them be. But none will be
perfect until men are perfect.
H. L. WILGUS.
Uni·vcrsity of Michigan.
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